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CHEVRON IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Kent Barnett* & Christopher J. Walker**
This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to
date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—
the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency
interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where
they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of
interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was
nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the
circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among
many other findings, our study reveals important differences across circuits,
agencies, agency formats, and subject matters as to judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations.
Based on prior empirical studies of judicial deference at the Supreme Court,
however, our findings suggest that there may be a Chevron Supreme and a
Chevron Regular: whereas Chevron may not have much of an effect on
agency outcomes at the Supreme Court, Chevron deference seems to matter in
the circuit courts. That there is a Chevron Supreme and a Chevron Regular
may suggest that, in Chevron, the Supreme Court has an effective tool to
supervise lower courts’ review of agency statutory interpretations. To render
Chevron more effective in creating uniformity throughout the circuit courts,
the Supreme Court needs to send clearer signals on how courts should apply
the deference standard.
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Introduction
It is a bedrock principle of administrative law that a reviewing court
must defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute it administers.1 This Chevron deference doctrine is both untouchable
and yet always under attack. Chevron deference has been a cornerstone of
judicial review of agency action for more than thirty years, and the decision
itself is one of the most cited Supreme Court decisions of all time. Indeed, as
of this writing, Chevron has been cited in more than 80,000 sources available
on Westlaw, including in roughly 15,000 judicial decisions and nearly 18,000
law review articles and other secondary sources.2

1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 Ga. L. Rev.
757, 786 (2015) (citing 1 Richard Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 3.2 (5th ed.
2010)); Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword, Symposium on Chevron at 30:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 475, 475 (2014).
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In these tens of thousands of sources, scholars, litigants, and judges have
contested Chevron’s theoretical grounding,3 its provenance,4 and its impact
on case outcomes.5 More recently, Supreme Court justices have questioned
not only Chevron’s reach6 but also its very existence.7 Congressional Republicans have followed suit by introducing legislation that would abolish Chevron deference and require courts to review agency statutory and regulatory
interpretations de novo. 8
3. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.
Rev. 363, 370 (1986) (referring to Chevron’s delegation theory as a “legal fiction”); Evan J.
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1273 (2008) (arguing that Chevron’s
methodology is pluralistic because all leading theories of the administrative state support deference); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and
the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that expertise
should inform judicial deference, not delegation of interpretive primacy); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517 (arguing that
Chevron’s delegation theory is a fiction providing a background rule for legislative drafting).
4. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L.
Rev. 113, 193–99 (1998) (arguing that Chevron is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 476 (1989) (“It is surely a far more remarkable
step than Chevron acknowledged to number among Congress’s constitutional prerogatives the
power to compel courts to accept and enforce another entity’s view of legal meaning whenever
the law is ambiguous.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
Geo. L.J. 833, 868 (2001) (noting that if Chevron is federal common law, it does not coexist
well with the judicial-review provisions of the APA).
5. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 829 (2010);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 85 (2011) (presenting ranges of agency affirmance rates under judicial-review
doctrines and finding that differences are “barely detectable,” except for deference to agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations).
6. See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed,
81 Mo. L. Rev. 1023, 1036–37 (2016) (noting the Court’s ignoring of Chevron when it would
have appeared to apply in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), and the Court’s refusal to apply Chevron to
matters of “deep ‘economic and political significance’ ” in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2489 (2015)). Three justices have argued that Chevron should not apply to agencies’ interpretations concerning the scope of the agency’s authority. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1877–86 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference presented “serious separation-of-powers questions” because it either, if interpreting a statute, contravened the original understanding that the Article III
judicial power requires courts to “say what the law is” or, if making policy, improperly delegated legislative power (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
8. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016)
(amending the APA to require courts to review “de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and rules”); Separation of
Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (same); see also Christopher J. Walker, Courts Regulating the Regulators, RegBlog (Apr. 25, 2016), http://
www.regblog.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/
2ZD5-6TQG] (explaining how pending legislation is an outgrowth of recent Supreme Court
criticism of Chevron deference).
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Much scholarly attention focuses on the use or absence of Chevron deference at the Supreme Court. Some scholars have focused on Chevron’s domain—that is, when Chevron applies in judicial review.9 Others have
considered empirically how consistently the Court applies Chevron. In their
leading study concerning agency deference in the Supreme Court from 1984
to 2006, Bill Eskridge and Lauren Baer found that the Court applied Chevron deference only one quarter of the time that it would have seemed to
apply.10 When the Court applied the doctrine, agencies prevailed 76.2% of
the time, a rate similar to those under other standards of review.11
In other words, the Court’s choice to apply Chevron deference, as opposed to a less-deferential doctrine or no deference at all, does not seem to
affect the outcome of the case. Chevron deference—at least at the Supreme
Court—does not seem to matter. As Richard Pierce has concluded, “There is
no empirical support for the widespread belief that choice of doctrine plays
a major role in judicial review of agency actions.”12 Scholars and commenters, moreover, have noticed the Court’s recent treatment of Chevron as
a doctrine to ignore, disparage, or distinguish.13
But Chevron in the Supreme Court is not our focus. Instead, we are
most concerned here with how Chevron works on the ground in the circuit
courts. Prior empirical studies of Chevron in the circuit courts were limited
to a particular court,14 particular agencies,15 particular subject matter,16 or a
9. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4.
10. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J.
1083, 1124–25 (2008); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
101 Yale L.J. 969, 982 (1992) (“[I]t is clear that Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme
Court. . . . [T]he two-step framework has been used . . . only about one-third of the [time].”).
11. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1142. A later study by Thomas Miles and Cass
Sunstein that considered decisions from 1989 until 2005 in which the Supreme Court invoked
Chevron found that agencies prevailed only 67% of the time. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 823, 849 (2006). “Since the period studied by Miles and Sunstein overlaps almost
completely with the last fifteen years of the period studied by Eskridge and Baer, the lower
affirmance rate found by Miles and Sunstein implies a decline in the Supreme Court’s rate of
affirmance in Chevron cases after 1990.” Pierce, supra note 5, at 83–84.
12. Pierce, supra note 5, at 93; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 Duke L.J. 1563, 1598 (2016).
13. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
1867, 1869 (2015) (“Some early commenters see these decisions as at least potentially marking
a watershed moment, a fundamental shift from a regime of meaningful deference to a reassertion of judicial supremacy.”).
14. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2168
(1998) (considering more than 200 D.C. Circuit decisions from 1991 to 1995).
15. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 825 (considering decisions from 1990 to
2004 concerning the NLRB or the EPA).
16. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking,
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev.
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short timeframe.17 They have also largely concentrated on the rates at which
agencies prevail under Chevron and the likelihood of judges’ policy preferences affecting Chevron’s application.18 Our inquiry and scope are significantly broader.
This Article presents the findings of the largest empirical study of Chevron in the circuit courts to determine how Chevron works outside the marbled enclave of One First Street. Our database of 2,272 judicial decisions,
collected with broad search parameters, attempts to cull all published decisions from the circuit courts over an eleven-year period (2003–2013) that
refer to the Chevron doctrine. Within the relevant 1,327 of those collected
opinions, we uncovered 1,558 instances of judicial review of an agency statutory interpretation (not merely any kind of agency action). Largely following
Eskridge and Baer’s methodology, we coded each agency statutory interpretation with respect to nearly forty different variables, including information
about the decision (circuit, year, judges, and separate opinions); information
about the agency interpretation (the agency, subject matter, final agency
decisionmaker, agency procedure used, and ideological valence of agency’s
interpretation); and information about the judicial outcome (outcome as to
agency, ideological valence of the decision, standard of review applied, and
factors that influenced the court’s decision).19 This broad set of cases permitted us to consider all instances within our parameters in which the circuit courts applied the Chevron framework. This set also permitted us to
review all instances in which the circuit courts, having referred to Chevron,
reviewed agency interpretations de novo or under the Skidmore deference
regime (under which courts defer to an agency’s interpretation based on

767, 784–85 (2008) (considering environmental-law cases in the circuit courts for a three-year
period).
17. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 4 (1998) (considering more than
200 cases from 1995 to 1996); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984, 989–90 (considering nearly
2,500 decisions, including those without published opinions, in six- or two-month periods
during certain years to ascertain Chevron’s effect on judicial review). Although the Schuck and
Elliott study is important and comprehensive, its more-than-thirty-year-old data fail to address contemporary appellate practice after Skidmore and the Court’s inconsistent use of its
deference doctrines. Moreover, the decisions, too, included all administrative decisions, not
just those concerning statutory interpretation, and the study did not identify the number of
agency interpretations upheld or reversed because it considered only remand rates. See Linda
R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 65,
91, 103 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17, at 103–06; Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at
2169–76 (considering panel composition on agency-win rates); Miles & Sunstein, supra note
11, at 825–26.
19. Our Codebook, which lists all of the variables with descriptions, is available at Kent
Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, 116
Mich. L. Rev. Online 1 (2017), http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
116MichLRevOnline1_BarnettWalker.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BPL-VP7R].
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several factors, including the thoroughness of the agency’s interpretation
and its consistency with prior pronouncements).20
This treasure trove of data, albeit with methodological limitations that
we discuss in Section II.B, provides a number of often-surprising insights
regarding deference to agency statutory interpretations in the circuit courts.
Many of these findings suggest, with some caveats, that there may be a Chevron Supreme and a Chevron Regular: whereas the choice to apply Chevron
deference may not matter that much at the Supreme Court, it seems to matter in the circuit courts. Consider the following key findings from the study:
First, agency interpretations were significantly more likely to prevail
under Chevron deference (77.4%) than Skidmore deference (56.0%) or, especially, de novo review (38.5%). In other words, agencies won significantly
more in the circuit courts when Chevron deference applied, at least when the
court expressly considered whether to apply Chevron. Indeed, there was
nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates with
Chevron deference (77.4%) than without (53.6%). Because the agency-win
rates in Eskridge and Baer’s study of the Supreme Court were much more
similar no matter whether Chevron (76.2%), Skidmore (73.5%), or de novo
review (66.0%) applied, this was one of our first indications that Chevron
Supreme differs from Chevron Regular.21
Second, when Chevron’s well-known two-step approach applied, the circuit courts resolved the matter at step one (i.e., the step at which the courts
ask whether Congress’s intent was clear) 30.0% of the time, and, of those
Chevron step-one decisions, agencies prevailed 39.0% of the time. Of the
70.0% of the interpretations that moved to Chevron step two (the step at
which the courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations when Congress’s
intent was not clear at step one), the agency prevailed 93.8% of the time.
Based on albeit-dated data from Tom Merrill, Chevron Supreme does not
behave like Chevron Regular. Merrill found that the Supreme Court resolved
matters in the agency’s favor 59% of the time at step one.22 (Merrill—and
others after him—did not report comparable data about the Supreme
Court’s step-two practice.) This difference may suggest that, given the higher
likelihood of circuit-court review than Supreme Court review, agencies
should give closer attention to the statutory language but that their step-two
explanations are largely sufficient.23
Third, as expected and as in the Supreme Court, formal agency interpretations prevailed at higher rates than informal ones, without regard to scope
of review. But unlike in the Supreme Court, where the agency-win rate for
formal adjudication (65.4%) was lower than notice-and-comment rulemaking (72.5%),24 agency-win rates in formal adjudication were slightly higher
20. For a discussion of Skidmore deference, in which courts retain interpretive primacy
and evaluate the weight to give an agency’s interpretation, see infra Section I.A.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. Merrill, supra note 10, at 981 tbl.1.
23. See infra Section III.B.
24. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1148 tbl.17.
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(74.7%, or 81.3% when excluding immigration adjudications with idiosyncratic review procedures) than notice-and-comment rulemaking (72.8%) in
the circuit courts. Formal interpretations, under a trilogy of Supreme Court
decisions,25 also unsurprisingly received Chevron deference at higher rates:
100.0% of the time for (albeit extremely rare) formal rulemaking, 91.9% for
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and 76.7% for formal adjudication (or
85.2% if excluding immigration adjudications). Informal interpretations
lagged behind at 44.8%. But, despite the Supreme Court treating legislative
rulemaking and formal adjudication alike in its Chevron doctrine, our numbers revealed that the circuit courts applied the Chevron framework less frequently to formal adjudication than rulemaking. Perhaps even more
surprising, when Chevron applied, interpretations in formal adjudications
had a higher agency-win rate (81.7%, and 86.0% without immigration decisions) than notice-and-comment rulemaking (74.4%). These findings suggest that agencies may want to reconsider formal adjudication as a substitute
to rulemaking as a means of adopting Chevron-eligible agency statutory interpretations, despite adjudication’s fall in popularity since the 1970s.26
Fourth, the circuit courts varied considerably as to overall agency-win
rates, application of Chevron, and agency-win rates under Chevron. For
overall rates, the First Circuit was the most agency friendly with an agencywin rate of 82.8%, while the Ninth Circuit was the least agency friendly with
a rate of 65.8%. As for Chevron’s application, the D.C. Circuit applied it
almost as a matter of course at 88.6% of the time, while the Sixth Circuit
applied it only 60.7% of the time. Once Chevron applied, though, the agency
seemed to prevail as a rule in the Sixth Circuit (88.2% of the time, the highest rate), while the agency won only 72.3% of the time in the Ninth Circuit,
the lowest rate. The differential between agency-win rates with and without
Chevron indicates that agencies prevailed more in all circuits when Chevron
applied. The most striking was the Sixth Circuit, with its nearly fifty-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates. Only the Eighth Circuit had a
differential that was less than five percentage points, and the Eleventh Circuit was the only other circuit with a differential of less than ten percentage
points. Although our data indicate that agencies win much more frequently
when Chevron applies in all but one circuit, they also suggest that the Supreme Court may need to send clearer signals if the Court wants Chevron to
apply evenly throughout the circuit courts.27
Fifth, agency-win rates varied dramatically by subject matter and by the
agency advancing the interpretation. For instance, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (82.5% overall agency-win rate), Treasury Department (78.9%), and, perhaps surprisingly, National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) (78.1%) were a few of the big winners among the agencies in the
dataset. By contrast, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) (42.9%), Energy Department (45.5%), and Department of Housing
25. See infra Section I.B.1.
26. See infra Section III.C.
27. See infra Part IV.
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and Urban Development (HUD) (54.2%) were among the biggest losers in
the circuit courts. The range of circuit courts applying Chevron deference
also varied considerably from 100.0% for the Interstate Commerce Commission/Surface Transportation Board (ICC/STB) to 36.4% to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). Moreover, independent agencies outperformed executive agencies as to overall agency-win rate (77.0% to 70.2%) and frequency
of Chevron application (82.5% to 73.2%)—though agency-win rate when
Chevron applied evened out some (79.6% to 76.8%).
Sixth, to our surprise, the circuit courts may not be as responsive to the
Supreme Court’s (often conflicting or vague) signals concerning exceptions
to Chevron for certain sensitive questions. The circuits applied Chevron to
two sensitive questions that we coded—74.3% of regulatory-jurisdiction
questions and 76.0% of state-law preemption ones—roughly at the same
rate as the overall average (74.8%). Once Chevron applied, the agency-win
rate for jurisdictional interpretations was lower at 70.5% than the average
Chevron agency-win rate of 77.4% for all interpretations. But the 78.9% win
rate for preemption interpretations was consistent with the overall average.
The small population of sensitive-question interpretations, especially the
preemption questions, limits the strength of inferences that one can draw
from the data. But these data may suggest that at least for certain matters,
the circuit courts have somewhat internalized the courts’ sensitive-question
exceptions to Chevron as part of its overall analysis but not at “step zero”
(i.e., the step where courts consider whether to apply Chevron’s two-step
approach).28
Seventh, long-standing agency interpretations prevailed under all deference regimes combined at a much higher rate (82.3%) than those that were
new and replaced no earlier interpretation (65.9%), those that were inconsistent with a prior interpretation (59.8%), and those whose duration we
could not discern from the decision (67.8%). The circuit courts, consistent
with Supreme Court doctrine but not practice, applied Chevron consistently
to long-standing and new interpretations, and—to our surprise—at an even
higher rate to inconsistent interpretations. But inconsistent agency interpretations prevailed under Chevron much less frequently (65.6%) than recent
(74.7%) and long-standing interpretations (87.6%). Indeed, we found that
agencies’ inconsistent interpretations prevailed significantly less than other
interpretations under every review standard except de novo review (although much more frequently under Chevron than other review standards).
Moreover, inconsistent interpretations based on new political administrations or unclear reasons were the least likely to prevail. These findings suggest that agencies seeking to change positions should work diligently to
ensure that their interpretations receive Chevron deference (by having the
force of law) and that they rely on grounds such as changed circumstances
or accumulated expertise.29
28. See infra Section VI.A.
29. See infra Section VI.B.
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Finally, we found that traditional contextual or theoretical grounds for
deference do not have much expressed salience in the circuit courts. Courts
mentioned only four of our nine coded factors in more than one in ten
interpretations. The most salient factors were agency procedures, agency
rulemaking authority, agency expertise, and interpretive stability. The first
two’s prominence are of little surprise because they track concerns for formality and delegation in leading precedent. Moreover, expertise and interpretive stability are factors for Skidmore deference and factors that the Court
has mentioned as relevant to Chevron in one leading decision. But the absence of the other factors—political accountability, public reliance, contemporaneity, uniformity in federal administrative law, and congressional
acquiescence—suggests that the circuit courts have found comfort in the
Court’s more rule-based line of decisions and have largely rebuffed another
decision’s more open-ended, sliding-scale inquiry that could give them additional discretion.30
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses Chevron’s birth,
theoretical underpinnings, and evolution. Part II discusses prior empirical
studies, our study design and methodology, and an overview of our dataset.
Part III provides the 10,000-foot view of our findings, looking at agency-win
rates, judicial application of Chevron deference (and its effect on agency-win
rates), and the effect of agency procedures on outcomes and deference regimes. Part IV then disaggregates the findings by circuit, whereas Part V
analyzes the results by agency and subject matter, including the differences
between executive and independent agencies. Part VI examines what else
seems to matter (or not) based on other variables in the dataset. The theoretical and normative implications of these findings, including how they
support or cast doubt on existing doctrine and theory, are discussed in each
of these Parts. The Article concludes by exploring the advantages of a Chevron Supreme and a Chevron Regular. Although Chevron may not have much
of an effect on agency outcomes at the Supreme Court (based on prior empirical studies of the Court), it seems to matter markedly in the circuit
courts. This may suggest that, in Chevron, the Supreme Court has an effective tool to supervise and rein in the lower courts in their review of agency
statutory interpretations. But the Court needs to provide additional guidance to ensure that Chevron applies consistently throughout the circuits.
I. Chevron’s Ever-Changing Role
Federal courts have a long-standing practice of deferring in some manner to federal agency statutory interpretations. But the level of deference,
triggers for deference, exceptions from it, and judicial discussions of deference have fluctuated significantly. Our purpose here is not to provide a complete history of judicial deference. Instead, this Part contextualizes Chevron
deference as necessary to understand the salience of our findings.

30. See infra Section VI.C.
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A. Discursive Deference to Agencies Before Chevron
Early federal courts deferred to agency action in two key ways. First,
they deferred to discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, executive decisions
in mandamus actions.31 Second, outside of mandamus actions, they often
“respected” agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions when
those interpretations were long-standing or contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment.32 As the administrative state grew in size and influence,
debates surrounding the intensity of judicial review of agency legal interpretations became more urgent and strident.33 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
fluctuated from the New Deal until Chevron between three deference
regimes.
Consistent with NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the first line of decisions called for significant deference to agency interpretations that had a
“reasonable basis in law.”34 In that case, for example, the Court deferred to
the NLRB’s interpretation that it provided in its adjudication of “employee,”
a “broad statutory term,” to include newsboys.35 The Court grounded that
deference on notions of congressional delegation to the agency to provide
the interpretation and administrative expertise.36
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,37 decided only one Term after Hearst, was the
standard-bearer for the second line of decisions in which the courts applied
an indefinite, multifactored inquiry to deference questions. The Skidmore
Court deferred to the flexible, contextual method that the Department of
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division called for in an interpretive ruling to determine whether “waiting time” was subject to overtime pay.38 After noting
that the agency’s interpretations were not controlling on the courts, the
Court held that they “constitute[d] a body of experience and informed judgment” to guide courts.39 The weight to give this agency guidance depends

31. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613–14 (1838);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
32. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale
L.J. 908, 941 (2017).
33. See id. at 966–82 (discussing judicial and academic debates concerning judicial review and challenges to the traditional approaches).
34. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
35.
36.
Modern
37.
38.
39.

Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. at 131–32.
Id. at 130. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1239 (2007) (collecting decisions).
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
Id.
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upon the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with previous and later agency pronouncements, and
“all those factors which give it power to persuade.”40
The final line appeared to apply de novo judicial review, without deference to the agencies. Richard Pierce identifies NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.41 as
a key example in which the Court, ignoring the NLRB’s contrary adjudicatory interpretation, substituted its own interpretation of the term “employee” under the National Labor Relations Act.42 It did so without referring
to notions of judicial deference.43
As others have noted, the Supreme Court was not consistent, despite
criticism from lower courts and despite scholarly efforts to provide a descriptive reconciliation of the competing scopes of review.44 Nor did the
Court seek to reconcile its various judicial-review regimes. But the Court’s
1984 Chevron decision, despite failing to provide doctrinal reconciliation,
appeared to provide clearer, simpler guidance.
B. Chevron and Its Domain
In Chevron, the Court famously created a two-step process for judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations that appeared to apply whenever
“a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”45 As to the first inquiry, the court should determine if Congress has
clearly provided its unambiguous intent on the issue. If Congress has not,
then the court, in its second inquiry, should ask whether the agency’s construction is permissible.46 The Court expressly stated that the agency has
room to adopt more than one reasonable interpretation, meaning that an
agency’s changed interpretation can receive deference.47 The Court largely
grounded Chevron deference on a theory that Congress had delegated interpretive primacy to the agency, instead of the courts.48 But the Court also
identified other theoretical support: agencies are institutionally superior to
courts because of their expertise over complex statutory schemes, and executive officials are more politically accountable than judges.49
40. Id. Since Skidmore, courts have relied on numerous other factors, including agency
expertise, the contemporaneity and longevity of the agency’s interpretation, formality, congressional acquiescence, and alignment between the agency’s interpretation and congressional
preferences. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 36, at 1258–59.
41. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
42. Pierce, supra note 2, at 157.
43. See Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267.
44. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 156; Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in
the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 562 n.95 (1985) (arguing that the Court relied
on ten different factors pre-Chevron).
45. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 863.
48. Id. at 843–44.
49. See id. at 865–66.
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Courts and scholars largely understood Chevron as a significant restatement or recalibration of judicial review,50 and it quickly gained prominence
in the lower courts, especially the influential D.C. Circuit.51 In so doing,
questions concerning Chevron’s “domain” quickly surfaced.52 As we discuss
in Section I.B.1, the most significant question was whether Chevron applied
to all agency interpretations, or only those that were sufficiently formal.53 In
a trilogy of decisions from 2000 to 2002, the Court addressed when Chevron
applied but sent inconsistent signals. As we discuss in Section I.B.2, additional questions arose as to Chevron’s reach even when agencies provided
formal interpretations, including: Does Chevron apply to an agency’s pronouncement concerning its own jurisdiction? Or to an agency’s preemption
of state law? Or to questions of deep economic or political significance?
1. The Role of Formality
In Christensen v. Harris County, the first of three key decisions concerning the role of formality, the Court held that an interpretation’s formality
influenced Chevron’s applicability and indicated that informal interpretations were not eligible for Chevron deference.54 The Court refused to apply
Chevron to the Department of Labor’s statutory interpretation in an opinion
letter, noting that an opinion letter is “not . . . a formal adjudication [that is,
on-the-record adjudication under the APA] or notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”55 The problem with interpretations in opinion letters, policy
statements, agency manuals, and other guidelines is that they “lack the force
of law.” 56 Instead, they are entitled only to respect under Skidmore.57 Justice
Scalia concurred, arguing that Skidmore was an “anachronism,”58 that Chevron should apply to all “authoritative agency positions,”59 and that the Court
had, indeed, applied Chevron to more than formal adjudication and noticeand-comment rulemaking.60 Justice Breyer, although dissenting, supported
the majority’s resuscitating Skidmore and contended that Chevron “made no
50. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 2, § 3.4 (discussing benefits of Chevron’s reconceptualization of judicial review); Keith Werhan, Principles of Administrative Law 372 (2d ed.
2014) (“Chevron fundamentally altered scope-of-review doctrine governing an agency’s interpretations of its enabling act.”).
51. Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 540–41 (6th ed. 2013); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 4, at 838; Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 718, 726–28 (1987).
52. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 848–52 (posing fourteen questions concerning
Chevron’s domain).
53. See id. at 849.
54. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
55. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. Id. at 590.
60. Id. at 590–91.
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relevant change” to judicial review.61 Instead, all it did was focus on congressional delegation.62
One year later, the Court doubled down in United States v. Mead Corp.
but left room for informal interpretations to receive Chevron deference.63
The Court provided more guidance for when Congress had delegated interpretive primacy to agencies: by giving agencies the authority to act with the
force of law through “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to
foster . . . fairness and deliberation . . . . Thus, the overwhelming number of
our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”64 Indeed, earlier in its opinion, it had stated that “[d]elegation . . . may be shown . . . by an agency’s
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.”65
But, despite Christensen’s contrary statements, the Court acknowledged that
Chevron’s applicability does not require such formality; the Court had bestowed Chevron deference upon informal agency interpretations.66 In denying the U.S. Customs Service’s letter rulings at issue Chevron deference, the
Court found no evidence of congressional intent for the rulings to have the
force of law.67 The Court remanded for the lower courts to decide whether
Skidmore deference applied.68 Conspicuously absent was any indication that
other values, such as expertise, mattered for triggering Chevron deference.
Justice Scalia, this time in dissent, largely repeated his views in Christensen.69
Soon thereafter, the Court suggested in dicta that Chevron’s domain depended on more than the formality of agency action. In Barnhart v. Walton,
the Court, after noting that the agency had exercised its rulemaking authority, deferred under Chevron to the Social Security Administration’s reasonable statutory interpretation in a regulation.70 But it didn’t stop there. It held
that the agency’s interpretation was “permissible” because it made “considerable sense,” was of long-standing duration (even if the regulation itself was
of recent vintage), and appeared to receive congressional acquiescence in
light of the relevant statute’s reenactment and amendment.71 The Court’s
focus on the long-standing nature of the interpretation was surprising because it had held, in Chevron itself, that Chevron deference applies even

61. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
64. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id. at 231.
67. Id. at 231–35.
68. Id. at 238–39.
69. See id. at 239–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. 535 U.S. 212, 217, 222 (2002).
71. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 219–20.
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when agencies change their interpretations.72 Moreover, consistent with
Mead, the Court stated that formality was not necessary.73 And it stated,
perhaps even more surprisingly, that formality was also insufficient, which
appears inconsistent with Mead’s strong suggestion that notice-and comment rules and formal adjudication always have the force of law to render
agency action Chevron-eligible.74 The Court then referred to other considerations, reminiscent of Skidmore’s.75
Mead, Christensen, and Barnhart altogether created the “Mead Puzzle,”
creating uncertainty for courts and agencies as to which factors are necessary
or sufficient to trigger Chevron deference.76 Generally, notice-and-comment
rulemaking and formal adjudication have been thought sufficient for Chevron eligibility, despite Barnhart’s contrary suggestion,77 and thus should be
treated similarly. But lower courts, as Lisa Bressman has highlighted, have
struggled with how to go about determining when informal interpretations
are Chevron-eligible78 and when they may engage in “Chevron avoidance”—
that is, accept the agency’s view under Skidmore or de novo review without
deciding whether the agency’s interpretation has the force of law.79 At the
same time, scholars, including one of us, have debated formality’s relationship with congressional delegation.80 Some have argued that formality provides procedures that, in Mead’s words, “foster . . . fairness and deliberation”
81 and provide a salience or transparency to permit congressional oversight.82
Others have argued that whether Congress wants to have an agency act with
72. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984);
accord Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82
(2005).
73. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222 (noting that “the presence or absence of notice-andcomment rulemaking [was not] dispositive” in Mead).
74. See id. But see Lawson, supra note 51, at 590 (“Mead establishes that an agency
interpretation that is promulgated as law and has an adequate procedural pedigree (informal
notice-and-comment rulemaking qualifies for this purpose) will definitely get Chevron
deference . . . .”).
75. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222 (including “the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has
given the question over a long period of time”).
76. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 56–58 (2015).
77. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1449–50 (2005) (discussing views).
78. See id. at 1458–64.
79. See id. at 1464–69.
80. Barnett, supra note 76, at 20–22 (discussing scholarly views); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 Va. L. Rev. 2009, 2043–44 (2011).
81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); see also Bressman, supra note
77, at 1449 (contending that “notice-and-comment rulemaking best ensures the transparency,
deliberation, and consistency that produce fair and reasonable laws”); Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 4, at 884–85 (arguing for Chevron to apply only to notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication based on public-participation values).
82. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 80, at 2044–45.
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the force of law is a separate question from whether Congress wants searching judicial oversight of the agency’s binding actions.83
2. Sensitive Questions
Even with sufficient formality, it was and continues to be unclear
whether Chevron applies to certain sensitive questions: so-called jurisdictional matters, preemption, and exceptionally important policy matters. In
addressing these questions, the Supreme Court has often provided more guidance on the theoretical underpinnings of Chevron deference and its
triggers.
The Court in City of Arlington v. FCC held that agency decisions concerning their jurisdiction are eligible for Chevron deference, largely because
of the difficulty in distinguishing jurisdictional questions from other statutory interpretations.84 In resolving this long-simmering issue, the majority
emphasized Chevron’s place in the judicial-review firmament as a stabilizing
doctrine in the lower courts,85 but oddly it left Mead’s place in doubt. Although the agency, according to the lower court, had engaged in informal
adjudication with notice-and-comment opportunities,86 the Court did not
engage in a Mead inquiry into whether the action had the force of law. Instead, the majority relied on the fact that the agency had general rulemaking
or adjudicatory authority and simply concluded without analysis that the
agency had exercised that authority when providing its interpretation.87 And
it suggested that Barnhart’s dicta—that Chevron may not apply to formal
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking—was disfavored because
the Court had never denied Chevron deference to interpretations in those
formats.88 Justice Breyer, concurring, abided by his contextual Barnhart approach.89 Three dissenting justices, similarly to Justice Breyer, would have
applied a searching inquiry into whether Congress delegated interpretive
primacy over the specific interpretation at issue.90

83. See Barnett, supra note 76, at 20–21, 38–48; David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 218. Merrill and Hickman also argued
that formality itself was not determinative; instead, it was whether the agency had congressionally delegated authority “to resolve controversies in a legally binding fashion.” Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 4, at 902.
84. See 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868–73 (2013).
85. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873–74.
86. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 241, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1863 (2013).
87. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
additional factors from Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).
90. See id. at 1881, 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The Court, however, has not squarely addressed state-law preemption. It
has applied both Chevron and Skidmore to agency preemption decisions, albeit disagreeing with the agency in both instances.91 Nina Mendelson has
called for the Court to apply Skidmore deference based on agencies’ lack of
expertise on federalism that influences preemption.92 And as a matter of
congressional delegation, Skidmore seems appropriate. In their survey of legislative drafters, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman found that a majority of
drafters do not think that Congress delegates preemption matters to agencies.93 Likewise, one of us has surveyed agency rule drafters, who mostly
thought that statutory ambiguity does not signal congressional delegation of
preemption matters to agencies.94
Finally, the Court recently held in King v. Burwell that Chevron does not
apply to questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance’ that [are]
central to [the] statutory scheme” at issue.95 In that case, the Court refused
to defer to the IRS’s interpretation of “an Exchange established by the
State.”96 Although, in previous cases, the Court had considered an issue’s
significance in deciding under Chevron step one whether Congress had
clearly expressed its view,97 this was only the second time that the Court
refused to extend Chevron deference to an admittedly ambiguous statutory
provision based on the significance of the matter.98 Moreover, the earlier
91. Compare Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (applying the
Chevron framework to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s preemption of state
visitorial powers in notice-and-comment regulation), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
576–77 (2009) (applying Skidmore framework to agency’s preemption decision in a noticeand-comment rule’s preamble).
92. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 742, 779
(2004).
93. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev.
901, 1004 (2013).
94. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 703, 721 (2014) (“[R]egarding preemption of state law, fewer than
half (46 percent) agreed that Congress intends to delegate preemption questions by
ambiguity.”).
95. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
96. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
97. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (explaining that Congress has consistently precluded the FDA from regulating the tobacco industry, which “constitute[s] a significant portion of the American economy”).
98. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the phrase ‘an Exchange
established by the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031]’ is unambiguous.” (second alteration in
original)); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006). Justice Breyer joined the
majority opinion in King. What may be surprising is that not only did he find that Chevron
should not apply to these exceptional significant questions, but earlier he had also indicated
that it should not apply, cryptically, to “an unusually basic legal question.” Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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decision that did so—Gonzales v. Oregon—was in the context of a fundamental change to a long-standing regulatory scheme, as opposed to a significant interpretation in a new statute, as in Burwell.99 Aside from delegation,
the Court focused on the IRS’s lack of expertise on health-insurance policy,100 suggesting that the Court had, once again, retreated from Mead and
City of Arlington’s sole focus on formalized authority and action.101
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created a complex framework for
determining whether Chevron applies to agency interpretations. Congressional delegation of interpretive primacy to an agency undoubtedly has a
preeminent place in the Court’s calculus. But how courts are to discern such
a delegation depends on the authority of the agency to act with the force of
law, the formality and procedure involved in the agency action, agency expertise, and the nature of the legal interpretation at issue. Similarly, the
Court has referred to other values that influence Chevron’s applicability or
judicial deference to the agency under any framework, such as the longstanding nature of the agency’s interpretation (albeit with repeated proclamations that agencies are eligible for Chevron after changing interpretations), political accountability, or congressional acquiescence. And scholars
have added other values: national uniformity102 and contemporaneity of an
agency’s interpretation with statutory enactments.103 Indeed, much like Justice Breyer, Evan Criddle has argued that deference under Chevron requires
the satisfaction of all leading theoretical grounds—delegation, expertise, political accountability, rationality, and uniformity; anything less calls for Skidmore’s framework.104 Part VI assesses what purchase these leading values and
other contextual factors, aside from the canonical delegation theory, have on
the federal circuit courts.
C. Chevron for Thee, But Not for Me
Perhaps given Chevron’s complexity, the Supreme Court has not been
consistent. In two empirical studies, Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court applied Chevron deference only one-quarter of the time in
which it would have seemed to apply.105 These findings were also generally
99. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 250–54 (discussing statute’s history and prior interpretation
by the Department of Justice).
100. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
101. But see Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?,
2015 Pepp. L. Rev. 33, 46 (“We do not know yet if the Court (or the lower courts) will extend
this sweeping change in administrative law to other regulatory contexts” or whether King v.
Burwell’s “new major questions doctrine may well be good for tax only.”).
102. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1112
(1987) (considering the values of national uniformity that Chevron furthers).
103. Bamzai, supra note 32, at 941 (referring to respect that judiciary gave to consistent
and contemporaneous executive interpretations as a canon of construction).
104. Criddle, supra note 3, at 1275.
105. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1124–25.

18

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1

consistent with Tom Merrill’s earlier findings that the Court used Chevron
“only about one-third of the [time].”106
The Court’s questionable loyalty to Chevron suggests that the doctrine is
not meant to discipline Supreme Court decisionmaking. Instead, the doctrine may better serve to control lower courts and provide nationwide uniformity.107 After all, the Court itself recently referred to Chevron as serving a
“stabilizing purpose” to prevent “[t]hirteen Courts of Appeals [from] applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test [that] would render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable.”108 And perhaps most importantly for
lower courts, it did so in the context of rejecting the dissent’s more provision-specific inquiry and, à la Mead, looking only at force-of-law
authority.109
II. Empirical Study of Judicial Deference
Before exploring our findings in Parts III through VI, we provide in this
Part a brief overview of key empirical studies of Chevron in the Supreme
Court and the circuit courts, our methodology, and an overview of the composition of our dataset.
A. Prior Empirical Studies of Chevron
Our purpose here is to identify the basic methodology of the prior studies that were relevant to our methodological choices and results. We discuss
our or others’ specific findings or methods in more detail as relevant to our
discussion in subsequent Parts.
1. Key Studies Concerning the Supreme Court
The most comprehensive study of deference in the Supreme Court
comes from Eskridge and Baer. Their study provided the model for our
Codebook and many of our variable fields, and it provides much of the data
to compare deference in the Supreme Court and courts of appeals. In their
study, they evaluated all Supreme Court decisions reviewing an agency’s
statutory interpretation between the issuance of Chevron in 1984 and
Hamdan v. Rumsfield in 2006.110 They coded 1,014 interpretations for 156
variables111 to describe which deference regimes the Supreme Court applied
106. Merrill, supra note 10, at 982.
107. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65
Duke L.J. Online 149, 156–58, 161–62 (2016), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1017&context=dlj_online [https://perma.cc/5W59-EXAR] (making this argument in the context of the Federal Circuit and agency interpretations of substantive patent
law).
108. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
109. See id.
110. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1094 (referencing Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S.
557 (2006)).
111. Id. at 1090.
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and how it did so.112 As most relevant here, they found that agencies prevailed 68.3% of the time, without regard to deference regimes.113 The Court
applied Chevron in only 8.3% of the decisions, and agencies prevailed 76.2%
of the time under Chevron.114 Skidmore, for its part, applied to 6.7% of the
decisions, and agencies prevailed 73.5% of the time,115 a rate that was significantly higher than the 60.4% win rate in Kristin Hickman and Matthew
Kreuger’s earlier study that considered Skidmore in the circuit courts.116 Eskridge and Baer also considered various “ad hoc” variables to which the
courts have referred in their deference decisions (some of which were also
factors in Barnhart)117: the interpretation’s longevity, the subject matter,
whether the interpretation concerned certain sensitive issues (such as preemption and jurisdiction), and factors that the Court referred to in its decision (such as congressional acquiescence, agency procedures, rulemaking
authority, etc.).118
One other study is relevant to our findings here. To determine the impact of the so-called Chevron revolution in the years shortly before and after
Chevron, Tom Merrill considered all decisions in the Supreme Court from
1984 to 1990 in which at least one justice identified a question of whether
the Court should defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation.119 He determined that, similar to Eskridge and Baer’s findings, the Court applied Chevron in only about one-third of the applicable decisions,120 and, surprisingly,
the agencies had a lower win rate after Chevron (both for the aggregate of
the decisions reviewed and for only those decisions in which the Chevron
framework applied), despite Chevron’s reputation for being agency
friendly.121 Finally, he found that the Court referred less often to traditional
deference factors (such as the interpretation’s long-standing nature and contemporaneity, congressional ratification, etc.) after Chevron.122
112. See id. at 1099 tbl.1.
113. Id. at 1100.
114. Id. at 1099 tbl.1.
115. Id.
116. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 36, at 1275.
117. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1157.
118. See id. app. at 1203–16.
119. Merrill, supra note 10, at 980–81, 981 tbl.1.
120. See id. at 982.
121. See id. at 981 tbl.1, 982 tbl.2, 984.
122. Id. at 984–85, 1018–22. Another study by Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein concluded, after reviewing all Supreme Court decisions from 1989 to 2005 that applied the Chevron framework, that Chevron did not constrain judges from validating agency interpretations
in accordance with the justices’ ideological preferences. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11, at
825–26. Because Miles and Sunstein focused almost exclusively on Chevron’s effect on judicial
ideology, their study has only minimal relevance for our findings here. To be sure, our dataset
also includes coding for all of these ideological variables as to the agency’s decision, the composition of the judicial panel, and the court’s decision. Those findings will be explored in
subsequent work.
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2. Key Studies Concerning Circuit Courts
More studies concern the courts of appeals, each with its own limitations on matters of judicial deference because of each project’s focus. The
largest study, by Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott, considered all administrative actions on direct review in the courts of appeals in various time periods
(1965, 1974–1975, 1984–1985, and 1988) to obtain a descriptive account of
how judicial review of agency action works in the lower courts—both before
and after Chevron.123 Although we refer to some of their findings in our
discussion below, their data, despite concerning nearly 2,500 published and
unpublished decisions on direct review,124 are of limited comparative use
here. As prior scholars have noted, Schuck and Elliott neither limited their
data to judicial review of agency statutory interpretations (and, relatedly,
whether courts validated agency interpretations) nor indicated how many
interpretations were upheld or reversed.125 Moreover, their more-than-aquarter-century-old study occurred a decade before the Court’s reaffirmation of the Skidmore and Chevron dichotomy, after which one would expect
that courts might decide decisions under the two regimes differently. Finally,
they primarily focused on whether Chevron affected agency-remand rates, as
compared to our focus on acceptance rates of agency interpretations
specifically.126
Two other studies concerning the circuit courts largely focus on the role
of judicial ideology, and thus they are of limited relevance of our findings
here. In one study, Tom Miles and Cass Sunstein considered all published
circuit-court decisions from 1990 to 2004 that applied Chevron to legal interpretations by the EPA and the NLRB.127 Because their purpose was to
investigate whether Chevron limited political ideology from affecting judicial
review, they focused on “two important agencies known for producing politically contentious decisions.”128 A second study by Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller considered the “whistleblower effect” in Chevron decisions in the
circuit courts—that is, the effect of having one judge of a different ideology
on a panel who can alert others to the majority’s failure to adhere to Chevron.129 To do so, they considered all decisions from the D.C. Circuit from
1991 to 1995 that cited Chevron.130 But, similar to Miles and Sunstein’s
study, their focus on one particular question and decisions from only one
court limits the study’s comparative value to the issues that we address here.
123. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 17, at 989–90.
124. See id. at 989 n.13, 990 n.14.
125. See supra note 17.
126. A later study by Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer found “a slight increase in the
appellate affirm rate in the mid-1980s,” although “less dramatic . . . than . . . found by Schuck
and Elliott.” Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17, at 103.
127. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 825, 848.
128. Id. at 848.
129. Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 2159–60.
130. See id. at 2168.
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Finally, Orin Kerr’s study had broader data than the studies above, providing us more comparative findings. Kerr sought to evaluate how well three
leading models (contextual, political, and interpretive) describe Chevron in
the circuit courts. 131 To that end, he reviewed 253 agency statutory interpretations in published circuit-court decisions from 1995 and 1996 that applied
the Chevron framework.132 Unlike Schuck and Elliott, who considered all
administrative actions and remand rates, he counted interpretations and
considered how often agencies prevailed on each interpretation.133 But similar to Shuck and Elliott, he considered only direct review of agency actions.134 His data concerning the “overview of Chevron” and the contextual
model (similar to the traditional or Barnhart factors that Eskridge and Baer
as well as Merrill considered) provide the most relevant comparisons to our
findings here,135 despite his shorter timeframe and smaller population of
interpretations.136
B. Our Study Design and Methodology
For our study, we completed several related searches on Westlaw to attempt to capture all published decisions over an eleven-year period in which
the circuit courts referred to Chevron. In contrast to prior studies’ focus on
certain courts, agencies, or issues, we considered all circuits and attempted
to include interpretations from all federal agencies. Likewise, in contrast to
short time frames in most other studies,137 we selected an eleven-year period
from January 1, 2003, until December 31, 2013. We began our study with
decisions from 2003 to ensure that courts and parties had sufficient time to
become accustomed to (1) instructions in the Supreme Court’s 2001 United
States v. Mead decision that clarified Chevron’s applicability and Skidmore’s

131. Kerr, supra note 17, at 3–4.
132. Id. at 18–20, 30.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 19–20.
135. See id. at 30–35, 31 fig.A, 32 charts 1 & 2, 33 chart 3, 35 fig.B.
136. Two final studies are relevant, but their different methods of reporting data render it
difficult to compare our data to theirs. First, Jason Czarnezki evaluated how the circuit courts
employed Chevron in environmental decisions from 2003 to 2005. Czarnezki, supra note 16, at
769. Like us, he searched for decisions that cited Chevron. See id. at 784 n.96. But because of
his significant focus on judicial ideology, he reported his findings in terms of individual
judges’ votes. See id. at 790–803. Second, Richard Re considered whether the circuit courts
applied the Chevron framework as the traditional two steps or as one “reasonableness” step.
Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 Ind. L.J. 605, 637–39 (2014). He reviewed
all published circuit-court decisions that cited Chevron in 2011. Id. But, as with Czarnezki’s
study, Re reported his data in a different manner than us, rendering comparison of our data
with his difficult or impossible. Nonetheless, we compare findings or consider their insights
when possible.
137. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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renaissance,138 and (2) certain factors for Chevron eligibility that the Supreme Court mentioned in dicta in 2002’s Barnhart v. Walton.139 Such a
large dataset allowed us to draw more meaningful conclusions concerning
the circuit courts collectively, each circuit individually, and each agency with
a significant number of reviewed interpretations.
Searching for all instances of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, as Eskridge and Baer did, was not feasible for the appellate
courts. Instead, we narrowed our parameters by focusing on references to
Chevron, similar to nearly all of the studies concerning circuit courts.140 Limiting ourselves to decisions that cited Chevron would give us the best data on
Chevron itself and, because of Chevron’s prominence, extremely useful data
on decisions in which judicial deference was in dispute. Although our
dataset does not permit us to paint as complete a picture as to non-Chevron
regimes as the Eskridge and Baer or Hickman and Krueger studies, we anticipated obtaining a sufficient number of applications to inform understandings of those doctrines.
We engaged in a broad, yet practicable, search for decisions. Simply
searching for “Chevron” returned too many false positives, since Chevron
Corporation is a party in numerous decisions and “Chevron” is part of the
case style of numerous other, unrelated decisions. To identify the decisions
concerning Chevron deference, we prepared searches that include “Chevron”
with relevant terms: agency, ALJ, order, formal adjudication, rule, and 553
(the APA section that concerns notice-and-comment rulemaking).141 To
render it more likely that we captured all Chevron deference decisions even if
the court did not use the word “agency” in its opinion, we ran similar, yet
even broader, searches for approximately twenty-five federal agencies that
we thought would be most likely to be involved in statutory interpretation.142
138. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
139. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). The significant time period also permits us or others to
consider in future work any differences that may exist during the Bush and Obama Administrations and the changing memberships on the circuit courts that occurred based on retirements and new appointments.
140. Miles and Sunstein did the same in their study of the Supreme Court. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 825 n.10. The key difference between our study and others is that other
studies generally coded only cases that applied the Chevron framework, while we coded all
cases that concerned statutory interpretation and referred to Chevron, whether or not the
court applied the Chevron framework.
141. We performed the following “advanced” searches on WestlawNext in the “CTA” (federal appellate cases) database: (1) (agency and Chevron /p “formal adjudication” ALJ order) &
DA(aft 12-31-2002 & bef 04-01-2013); (2) (Chevron /p rule or 553) & DA(aft 12-31-2002 &
bef 04-01-2013). We performed the same searches for the period from April 1, 2013, until
December 31, 2013.
142. We performed the following “advanced” search on WestlawNext in the CTA database:
(chevron /p interp! and “[agency]”) & DA(aft 12-31-2002 & bef 04-01-2013)—for each of the
following agencies: USDA, BIA, CFTC, DEA, DHS, EPA, Education, FCC, FDA, FERC, FLRA,
FMC, FMSC, FTC, HHS, HUD, Interior, ITC, Labor, NLRB, NTSB, OSHA, SEC, SSA, Transportation, and the Postal Service. We performed the same searches for the period from April 1,
2013, until December 31, 2013. Although we did not perform any sampling to determine
whether we likely captured all informal interpretations that may go by names other than rules
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Because Mead indicated that Chevron is most applicable to formal adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking,143 we used terms especially designed to capture decisions concerning these methods of agency action. But
our terms (e.g., rule, order, and interpretation) would also have captured
less formal methods of agency action, such as interpretive rules or informal
adjudications, to which Chevron can apply.144 Unlike Schuck and Elliott and
some of Kerr’s data, we collected decisions concerning direct and collateral
review. We then combined all of the collected decisions into one database,
removed duplicates, and removed a handful of obviously irrelevant authorities (such as unpublished decisions or treatises that were included in the
results for unknown reasons). We ultimately had a database of 2,272
decisions.145
Our research assistants initially reviewed the decisions, and we then
completed a secondary review of every decision to increase uniformity and
validity. In our secondary review, we divided the cases up randomly for one
of us to review, and we flagged cases for a third-level review where the other
then weighed in. One of us then conducted a more systemic review of the
cases in preparing the dataset for analysis in the IBM SPSS statistics
software. For all decisions with at least one instance of an agency’s statutory
interpretation of a statute that it administers, we coded each instance of
interpretation within one case as its own entry (as Kerr, Re, and Hickman
and Krueger did, but Eskridge and Baer did not), meaning that one decision
could have more than one entry in our dataset. 146 We had a total of 1,558
separate instances of statutory interpretation from 1,327 judicial opinions.

or orders, we expected that the much broader term “interpretation” with the most well-represented agencies would likely capture most informal interpretations without the terms “guidance” or “letters”—and other forms of informal interpretations—that may lead to too many
false positives.
143. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31.
144. Similar to another study, we did not attempt to obtain decisions in which the courts
should have applied Chevron but failed to do so or decisions that applied a Chevron-like review
without citing Chevron. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 36, at 1260 (concerning Skidmore). We have little reason to think that these decisions would materially change our findings,
see id., and searching for these cases would have led to an impracticable review given the
number of courts and years that our search considered.
145. Like Eskridge and Baer, we do not conduct significance tests because our database
contains, to the best of our knowledge, the entire population of cases that interest us, as opposed to a sample of that population. Significance testing reveals the likelihood that variation
with sampling occurs because of variation in the entire population, as opposed to random
variation. Because we are reporting the results of a full population of interpretations, the variations exist with certainty. We, like Eskridge and Baer, can concentrate on why the variations in
our findings exist and whether they are material. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at
1095–96.
146. Although, as discussed below, we largely followed Eskridge and Baer’s lead in how to
code certain information, one key difference is that they coded each decision only once and
relied on a “mixed” category for when one decision had more than one issue of statutory
interpretation. See id. app. at 1213.
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We coded the decisions on a spreadsheet for thirty-seven147 variables
identified in our Codebook, which provided guidance to our reviewers in
coding. In broad strokes, aside from relevance,148 we coded the decisions for
the following:
•

identifying information, such as the relevant circuit, judges, and additional opinions concerning statutory interpretation;

•

the nature of the agency’s interpretation, such as the agency, the subject
matter, the agency’s format and final decisionmaker,149 the political valence of the interpretation largely based on Eskridge and Baer’s definitions,150 and the long-standing nature of the agency’s interpretation or
novelty (and reasons for any new interpretation);

•

whether the agency’s interpretation concerned certain sensitive topics,
such as its own jurisdiction, state-law preemption, or foreign affairs;
and

•

the nature of the judicial decision, such as the result for the agency,
political valence of the court’s interpretation based on Eskridge and
Baer’s definitions, the applied deference regime, how the court applied
Chevron if it was the applicable regime, and traditional factors that Eskridge and Baer identified in their study.

147. The variables were as follows: (1) year, (2) circuit, (3) relevance, (4) authoring judge,
(5) en banc, (6) dissent, (7) other opinions, (8) agency, (9) subject matter, (10) final decisionmaker, (11) agency interpretation’s political valence, (12) agency format, (13) the type of
any informal interpretation, (14) continuity, (15) reason for evolution, if any, of agency’s
interpretation, (16) congressional delegation, (17) jurisdictional issue, (18) regulatory interpretation with statutory interpretation, (19) state-law preemption, (20) foreign-affairs issues,
(21) judicial interpretation’s political valence, (22) whether the court accepted the agency’s
interpretation, (23) the outcome of the petition or challenge, (24) whether the court applied
Chevron, (25) the application of Chevron step one, (26) the application of Chevron step two,
(27) the court’s deference regime, if any, (28) consideration of agency expertise, (29) consideration of accountability, (30) consideration of national standards, (31) consideration of the
consistency of an agency’s interpretation, (32) consideration of contemporaneity of the agency
interpretation with statutory enactment, (33) consideration of public reliance, (34) consideration of rulemaking authority, (35) consideration of agency procedures, (36) consideration of
congressional acquiescence, and (37) subsequent Supreme Court history.
148. We identified as relevant only those decisions that concerned judicial review of an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers because Chevron applies only to those
interpretations. We did not code agency interpretations of their own regulations or federal or
state statutes that they do not administer. Likewise, we marked decisions as irrelevant if we
were not able to discern whether the court was reviewing a matter of statutory interpretation
or if the court did not command a rationale that commanded a majority, rendering further
coding impossible.
149. If, as was very common, the court merely identified the position at issue as that of
the agency or a delagatee, we coded the final decisionmaker as the head of the agency.
150. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1205–06 (defining coding for interpretations).
To the interpretations coded as “liberal,” we added trade decisions that favored domestic industry. To the interpretations coded as “conservative,” we added trade decisions that favored
foreign industry and instances in which companies accused of polluting the environment or
violating business-regulating laws prevailed.
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As we discuss our findings in Parts III through VI, we will explain additional methodological matters as relevant to our findings’ implications. Because of the wealth of information provided by the raw numbers alone, in
this Article we have chosen to present our findings descriptively, saving
more sophisticated statistical analysis of the data for subsequent work. But
before turning to our findings, it is important to note a number of significant methodological limitations inherent in our study design.
First, like most of the prior studies, we reviewed only published decisions based on the view that the courts were likely to designate decisions as
published in which they reviewed a federal agency’s statutory interpretation
and that they were likely to mark decisions as unpublished when they referred to their past review of agency interpretations as circuit precedent. As
one of us has documented in an empirical analysis of constitutional litigation, it may well be the case that courts engage in strategic behavior by not
publishing certain decisions.151 Although it is theoretically possible that a
court could strategically not publish a decision that strikes down an agency
statutory interpretation or refuses to apply Chevron deference, it is more
likely that unpublished decisions both apply Chevron deference and uphold
agency statutory interpretations. Accordingly, if anything, our findings likely
underestimate the overall effect of Chevron deference in the circuit courts.
Second, we reviewed only circuit courts. To be sure, district courts also
apply Chevron. 152 But we reasoned that many, if not most, review comes to
the courts of appeals and significant district-court decisions would likely be
appealed—though one could argue that the federal government may not
appeal certain losses for fear of creating binding precedent. Similarly, our
study can only evaluate the effect of Chevron deference with respect to
agency statutory interpretations that actually make it to the circuit courts.
Our prior experience litigating such cases suggests that regulated entities and
individuals will often not waste resources to bring judicial challenges to
agency statutory interpretations precisely because of the deferential standards of review. In other words, our findings may well underestimate the
overall effect of Chevron deference on agency interpretive practices.153
Third, we culled only those decisions in which courts invoked Chevron
by name. Our database did not include instances in which they referred to a
151. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 Emory L.J. 55
(2016).
152. See, e.g., A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 381 F. Supp. 2d 469, 484 (D. Md. 2005)
(“Therefore, before conducting a Chevron deference analysis, this Court must first determine
whether Chevron deference is even appropriate.”), aff’d sub nom. A.T. Massey Coal Co. v.
Holland, 472 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2006); Fontana v. Caldera, 160 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128–29
(D.D.C. 2001) (“[T]his Court should apply Chevron deference to the ABCMR’s statutory interpretation.”), aff’d sub nom. Fontana v. White, 334 F.3d 80 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
153. Indeed, one of us has surveyed 128 agency rule drafters about how they interpret
statutes and draft regulations and found some support for the intuitive proposition that a
federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive efforts if it is confident that Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or de novo review) applies. See Christopher J. Walker,
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 999, 1059–65 (2015); see also Walker,
supra note 94, at 721–28 (exploring these findings in detail).
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Chevron-like doctrine by another name, including the name of a circuit or
Supreme Court precedent that functioned similarly,154 or failed to refer to
Chevron based on inadvertence of strategic behavior.155 Nor does our dataset
include cases where Chevron was not mentioned at all. This approach limits
our ability to compare agency-win rates under Chevron and other deference
standards, though the findings of other studies on Skidmore deference and
de novo review are consistent with our findings. For instance, one could
imagine instances in which a reviewing court intentionally does not cite
Chevron deference when setting aside an agency statutory interpretation.
Perhaps more likely, though, are situations where the federal agency strategically decides not to invoke Chevron deference for fear of limiting Chevron’s
domain in future cases of similar procedural posture (less-formal procedures) or substantive position (major constitutional or policy questions).
Or, conversely, in easy interpretation cases, the agency may forgo more formal procedures and thus not request any deference.156
To further address this methodological limitation, we coded separately
every published circuit-court decision that cited Skidmore during that same
eleven-year period (2003–2013). The total number of such cases was 168, of
which only 55 were deemed relevant. Because this Article focuses on how
circuit courts cite and use Chevron, we have decided not to include these
Skidmore-only cases in our description of the findings. Instead, we separately
note, where helpful for comparison purposes, the findings for the Skidmoreonly cases.
Fourth, although we largely based our coding on Eskridge and Baer’s
model, our comparative findings are each based on different periods of time.
Their study considers decisions from approximately 1985 until 2006, while
ours considers decisions from 2003 until 2013. Likewise, one should remember that other studies of Chevron in the circuit courts, to which we often
compare our data, consider different time periods, or sometimes limited circuits or subject matters.
Fifth, consistent coding is inherently difficult because of the large number of decisions and the judgments required in the face of unclear judicial
language. To mitigate these concerns, we included several procedural checks
in our study design, such as continual communication with reviewers during
154. For instance, the Supreme Court granted the NLRB “substantial deference” and
deemed an NLRB interpretation “reasonable” without mentioning its recent Chevron decision.
Pattern Makers’ League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985). Likewise, before Chevron,
the Supreme Court applied a Chevron-like doctrine to Federal Reserve interpretations of the
Truth in Lending Act. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (requiring
courts to accept TILA regulations that were not “demonstrably irrational”).
155. Similarly, in an attempt to obtain all of the relevant circuit-court decisions, we included decisions that the Supreme Court later reviewed (whether or not the Court affirmed,
reversed, or vacated the lower-court judgment). But we did not include panel decisions that
the en banc court vacated on the theory that the en banc court’s decision provided a better
guide of the circuit’s practice.
156. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 Tex. L. Rev.
See also 54, 79 (2012), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Walker.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JE7Z-HRC7].
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the review process, a secondary review by only the two of us (with significant communication during the secondary review), and a tertiary systemic
review in the IBM SPSS statistics software to check for inconstancies across
cases. A number of our coding variables facilitated this systemic review since
they required consistent answers. We also cross-checked numerous coding
fields to improve consistency after our secondary review.157
C. Overview of Our Dataset
Before presenting our findings in Parts III through VI, it is helpful to
sketch out the composition of the dataset. As noted in Section II.B, our
original set of 2,272 circuit-court decisions published from 2003 through
2013 resulted in 1,558 instances (from 1,327 decisions) in which a circuit
court reviewed an agency statutory interpretation. The interpretations are
evenly spread throughout the eleven-year time period. 158 But they are not as
evenly distributed by circuit, agency, subject matter, or format of agency
procedure.
For example, nearly one in five interpretations came from the D.C. Circuit (19.7%), followed by the Ninth Circuit (16.9%), Second Circuit
(11.0%), Third Circuit (8.5%), and Federal Circuit (7.9%).159 Although
scholars and practitioners likely expect the D.C. Circuit’s preeminence based
on its role as “a de facto, quasi-specialized administrative law court,” 160
Schuck and Elliott found that, as late as the 1980s, the Federal Circuit reviewed the most agency decisions. 161 As for subject matter, 30.6% of interpretations concerned immigration, perhaps explaining in part the Ninth
Circuit’s disproportionate share of the interpretations in the dataset. 162 The
157. These are, of course, not the only methodological limitations. For instance, any attempt to draw inferences about the legal system from a selection of trial or appellate opinions
has problems. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts
Redux? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 100,
100–01 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 503–04 (1989); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1984). The purpose of this
study, however, is not to draw inferences about the larger legal system but to better understand
how circuit courts apply administrative law’s deference doctrines—recognizing that there are
selection effects embedded in the sample of legal disputes that reach the appellate stage.
158. There were 165 interpretations in 2003, 165 in 2004, 145 in 2005, 145 in 2006, 134 in
2007, 138 in 2008, 132 in 2009, 117 in 2010, 143 in 2011, 129 in 2012, and 145 in 2013. This
does not necessarily mean that the use of Chevron deference has remained stable over time. As
noted in Section II.B, courts may not always cite Chevron itself in light of strategic behavior,
inadvertence, or reference instead to other circuit precedent that further develops the Chevron
doctrine within that circuit under a different name.
159. Circuit-by-circuit differences are explored further in Part IV.
160. Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court, at xiii
(1999).
161. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 17, at 1017–18.
162. This finding is consistent with a prior empirical study of judicial review of immigration adjudications conducted by one of us. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand
Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1553, 1584 (2014)

28

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1

environment (13.9%) and entitlement programs (8.9%) were the next most
predominant subject matters. If the subject matters of employment, labor/
collective bargaining, and pensions are combined, they represented 10.5%.
The dataset’s breakdown by agency was similar.163
As for agency format, of the 1,558 interpretations, roughly a third resulted from notice-and-comment rulemaking (36.5%) and another third
from formal adjudication (36.1%). With the latter, we included immigration
adjudications and similar adjudications that perhaps are not APA-defined
formal adjudications but nevertheless have been recognized by courts as being sufficiently formal to be accorded Chevron deference. Only four (0.3%)
agency interpretations arose in formal rulemaking, whereas the remaining
interpretations (24.8%) involved some sort of informal interpretation.164
Finally, nearly two-thirds (63.0%) of the agency interpretations were
“conservative” under the Eskridge–Baer model,165 with 29.2% “liberal” and
the remainder (7.8%) neutral, mixed, or otherwise too difficult to categorize. By contrast, only half (51.3%) of the court decisions on the agency
statutory interpretation were “conservative,” with 40.9% “liberal” and the
remainder (7.8%) neutral, mixed, or otherwise too difficult to categorize. In
other words, the circuit courts tended to decide statutory interpretation issues more liberally than agencies.166
III. General Findings on Chevron in the Circuit Courts
We begin by considering three categories of findings: (1) agency-win
rates under all standards of review and the frequency of standards of review
in our dataset, (2) how circuit courts applied Chevron’s two steps when
Chevron applied, and (3) agency-win rates under differing interpretive
formats.
A. Agency-Win Rates and Deference Differences
Consistent with prior studies, federal agencies in this study prevailed
most of the time—in 71.4% of interpretations—when we considered all interpretations together (that is, under any scope of review). None of the prior
studies tracks perfectly with ours, but some provide limited comparison. For
(noting that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s decisions constitute over 45 percent of the overall sample
(154 of 342)” of nationwide circuit-court decisions); see also id. at 1585 n.153 (noting that in
2012, the Ninth Circuit decided 40.5% of all immigration adjudication decisions in the circuit
courts).
163. We further explore subject-matter and agency-by-agency differences in Part V.
164. The effects of agency procedure are explored further in Section III.C. Because decisions by FERC were difficult to categorize, those 37 interpretations (2.4%) were treated as a
separate category in the dataset.
165. This Eskridge–Baer model is defined in supra note 150.
166. Although we discuss these conservative–liberal results where relevant, many of those
findings lie outside the scope of this Article. We intend to explore these results and the ideology of the panel judges in subsequent work.
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instance, Schuck and Elliott found that, in 1984 and 1985, the agency prevailed 76.7% of the time based on the overall outcome for the agency
(meaning the result for the agency, whether or not the agency prevailed on
the statutory-interpretation issue alone) in their review of circuit-court decisions of any agency action on direct review.167 Likewise, Eskridge and Baer
found that the agency prevailed 68.3% of the time in their review of Supreme Court decisions from 1984 until 2006 in which an agency’s interpretation of a statute was at issue.168 And Tom Merrill’s review of similar
Supreme Court decisions from 1984 until 1990 found that the agency prevailed 70.0% of the time.169
The overall win rate differed somewhat depending on whether the
agency statutory interpretation under review was “conservative” or “liberal”
per the Eskridge–Baer model: “conservative” agency statutory interpretations were upheld 69.3% of the time (982 total “conservative” interpretations), whereas “liberal” interpretations were upheld 74.5% of the time (455
total “liberal” interpretations). In the remaining 121 interpretations where
the agency interpretation was neutral, mixed, or otherwise too difficult to
categorize, the agency won 76.0% of the time.170
Similarly, in 74.8% of interpretations the circuit courts applied the
Chevron deference framework.171 By contrast, they applied the Skidmore
standard to 10.8% of the interpretations and refused to apply any deference
(de novo review) to 7.5% of them. In the remaining interpretations (107
interpretations, or 6.9% of total interpretations), the courts declined to
choose a deference standard, usually holding that the answer would have
been the same under any standard. When discussing these deference-regime
findings, care should be taken, especially in comparing the findings from
this study with those of prior studies. This study looked only at decisions in
which courts cited Chevron deference, so it is no doubt far from a complete
picture of the Skidmore and no-deference precedent in the circuit courts.
That said, our large number of Skidmore and no-deference decisions provides a meaningful understanding of judicial review of agency action more
generally, even if not a complete picture. It is also probably reasonable to
167. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 17, at 1008.
168. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1094, 1100.
169. Merrill, supra note 10, at 981 tbl.1. Perhaps counterintuitively, he also found that in
the three years before Chevron, the Court agreed with agencies more often (75% of the time).
Id. at 982 tbl.2.
170. By comparison, among the 55 Skidmore-only decisions, “conservative” agency statutory interpretations were upheld 63.0% of the time (27 total “conservative” interpretations),
whereas “liberal” interpretations were upheld 60.9% of the time (23 total “liberal” interpretations). In the remaining 5 interpretations where the agency interpretation was neutral, mixed,
or otherwise too difficult to categorize, the agency won 40.0% of the time.
171. With respect to “conservative” agency statutory interpretations, the courts applied
the Chevron deference regime 73.8% of the time (725 of 982 interpretations), compared to
75.4% for “liberal” interpretations (343 of 455 interpretations). In the remaining 121 interpretations where the agency interpretation was neutral, mixed, or otherwise too difficult to categorize, the courts applied the Chevron deference standard 81.0% of the time.
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conclude that our study captures the vast majority of published circuit-court
decisions during the time period where the agency requested Chevron deference (as one would assume that courts would typically address the deference
question if a party raised it).
As detailed in Figure 1, the agency prevailed at a higher rate than the
overall agency-win rate (77.4% to 71.4%) when the court determined that
Chevron applied. Conversely, the win rate dropped considerably when the
court did not apply the Chevron standard: 66.4% when the court refused to
decide which standard applies; 56.0% under the Skidmore standard; and
38.5% when the court applied de novo review.172
Figure 1. Agency-Win Rates by Deference Standard (n=1558)
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9 0 .0 %
8 0 .0 %
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Again, comparison between deference regimes based on the decisions
reviewed should be done carefully, since the dataset only includes decisions
in which circuit courts expressly mentioned Chevron deference. It would not
include decisions in which the court only mentioned Skidmore or reviewed
interpretations de novo without mentioning Chevron—perhaps decisions in
which one may expect higher agency-win rates whose inclusion would alter
the results that we found. But at least in instances in which the court recognizes Chevron expressly in its opinion, the application of the Chevron framework seems to make a meaningful difference as to whether agencies prevail
on the interpretive question. Indeed, there was nearly a twenty-four-percentage-point difference in win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron
172. By comparison, among the 55 Skidmore-only decisions, the circuit courts applied the
Skidmore framework in 100.0% of the cases, and the agency won 60.0% of the time—slightly
higher than the 56.0% agency-win rate in our Chevron dataset when circuit courts decided to
apply Skidmore deference.
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deference (77.4%) than when they refused to apply it (53.6%). The agency
was twice as likely (77.4% to 38.5%) to prevail if the court applied Chevron
deference as opposed to reviewing the interpretation de novo and nearly
three-fourths more likely (77.4% to 56.0%) to prevail under Chevron than
Skidmore. In other words, agencies won more in the circuit courts when
Chevron deference applied, at least when the court expressly considered
whether to apply Chevron deference.
These findings challenge certain conclusions based on earlier studies.
Evaluating affirmance rates in the Supreme Court and circuit courts from
earlier studies, Richard Pierce found that, as relevant here, the affirmance
ranges for de novo, Skidmore, and Chevron review overlap: 66% for de novo
review, 55.1% to 70.9% for Skidmore, and 64% to 81.3% for Chevron. 173 He
concluded that “a court’s choice of which doctrine to apply in reviewing an
agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes in the Supreme
Court or the circuit courts.”174 Contrary to his conclusion concerning the
circuit courts, our findings suggest that agency-win rates are meaningfully
different under different deference regimes.
Our findings concerning Chevron (77.4% agency-win rate) are within
the range of prior affirmance rates for circuit courts—from 64.0% to
81.3%.175 But importantly, our findings indicate that the affirmance rate is
significantly towards the upper end of the range, and they may have the
most validity because our data were the only to consider all agencies and all
circuit courts over more than a decade.176 Interestingly, our agency-win rate
is almost identical to the one that Eskridge and Baer found for the Supreme
Court (76.2%).177
Likewise, our finding that circuit courts agreed with agencies 56.0% of
the time when Skidmore applied is consistent with three of four earlier studies finding relatively lower affirmance rates. Those three earlier studies
found agency affirmance rates of 55.1% in 1965, 60.6% in 1975, and 60.4%
from 2001 to 2005.178 The consistency of findings within a range of approximately five percentage points suggests that one study of decisions from 1984

173. Pierce, supra note 5, at 83–84. Only one study—Eskridge and Baer’s study of the
Supreme Court—provided data on de novo review. See id.
174. Id. at 85.
175. Id. at 84.
176. See id. (noting shorter time frames of earlier studies). Indeed, the lowest affirmance
rate (from Miles and Sunstein’s study) only considered decisions from two agencies (the NLRB
and EPA) that were perceived as ideologically contentious. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11,
at 848. Our affirmance rate was also very close to the one that Re found for circuit-court
decisions from 2011. See Re, supra note 136, at 639 (“[T]he government won about threequarters of all Chevron cases.”).
177. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1142 tbl.15.
178. Pierce, supra note 5, at 84 (considering Schuck & Elliott’s study of Skidmore decisions
in 1965 and 1975, and Hickman & Krueger’s study from 2001 to 2005).
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with the highest affirmance rate of 70.9% in the circuit courts is an outlier.179 Although our Skidmore data come only from decisions that also mentioned Chevron and not all decisions that applied Skidmore, we are
comforted that our results are very similar to results from earlier studies that
did include all Skidmore decisions.
Finally, the affirmance rates for the circuit courts’ de novo review only
further support this view. Although the de novo affirmance rate was 66.0%
in the Supreme Court (with no data available for the circuit courts),180 our
data revealed that the circuit courts affirmed agencies’ interpretation only
38.5% of the time, at least when the court had cited Chevron. Our data,
accordingly, suggest that the range of affirming agency interpretation is
about forty percentage points from de novo to Chevron review and about
twenty percentage points from Skidmore to Chevron. Contrary to Pierce’s
conclusions based on earlier studies, agency-win rates do appear to differ
significantly under different deference regimes.
Of course, these data cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between
deference regimes and agency-win rates. For instance, courts could be strategically choosing deference regimes that more easily allow them to reach an
outcome that matches their policy preferences. But one shouldn’t overstate
this concern. First, Mead constrains judicial discretion by focusing heavily
on force-of-law authority. Second, there is probably no perfect way to test
for strategic behavior because we would have to know the “correct” result
and compare that to the result that the court reached. That said, there are
some ways to see if courts are seeking to get around Mead. One easy way
would be to invoke Barnhart’s ad hoc factors or theoretical grounds for deference, but, as described in Section VI.C, they rarely do so. Indeed, the
courts applied Chevron at almost identical rates to “conservative” and “liberal” agency interpretations.181 Future work that considers ideology may
provide more insight.
In sum, using agency-win rates as an admittedly less-than-perfect heuristic to assess the meaningfulness of deference regimes, as others before us
have done, we see that deference regimes appear to matter.
B. How Chevron Is Applied
Of the 1,558 total interpretations reviewed, the circuit courts applied the
Chevron framework in 1,166 of them (74.8%). Of those 1,166 interpretations, the agency prevailed 902 times (77.4%). The more interesting questions, however, may concern how the circuit courts applied the two-step
framework. In other words, how many decisions were decided at step one?
How many were decided at step two? And, perhaps most importantly, what
179. See id. (considering Schuck & Elliott’s study of Skidmore decisions in 1984). The
73.5% affirmance rate for Skidmore—the highest affirmance rate that Pierce considered—concerned the Supreme Court, not the courts of appeals. See id. at 83.
180. See id. at 83–85.
181. See supra note 171 .
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were the agency-win rates at each step? Figure 2 depicts the overall win/loss
numbers at both steps, with the percentages reflecting the portion of the set
of interpretations in which the circuit courts applied the Chevron
framework.
Figure 2. Agency Win/Loss Rates by Chevron Step for
Interpretations Where Chevron Framework Applied
(n=1166)
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Consistent with prior studies, the vast majority of agency interpretations
(817 interpretations, or 70.0%) made it to step two.182 And an even greater
percentage of interpretations that made it to step two (766 interpretations,
or 93.8%) were upheld. Indeed, we found that the agency won slightly more
under step two (whether the court describes its analysis as one of “reasonableness” in one step or two) than in an earlier study. In comparison to our
agency-win rate of 93.8% under step two, Kerr found that agencies in 1995
and 1996 won at step two or in a one-step “reasonableness” inquiry a combined total of 84.7% (156 out of 184 interpretations) of the time. 183 To be
sure, it is not true that Chevron, at least as an empirical matter, has collapsed

182. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 31 (noting that out of 253 interpretations, 72.7% were
resolved under a “reasonableness” inquiry under a Chevron analysis with only one step (72
interpretations) or under step two of a two-step inquiry (112 interpretations)). Notably, Merrill found almost the inverse in his study of Supreme Court decisions from 1984 to 1990—only
44% of Chevron decisions made it to step two. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 980–81.
183. Kerr, supra note 17, at 31. For our coding, we did not distinguish decisions that
applied a Chevron “one step” from a “two step.” We attempted, instead, to categorize judicial
decisions under a two-step framework. For comparative matters, we treated all of Kerr’s onestep “reasonableness” cases as getting to step two because we coded decisions that only referred to an agency’s interpretation as “reasonable” or “unreasonable” as reaching step two.
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into just one step of statutory ambiguity.184 In particular, fifty-one agency
statutory interpretations in our dataset—6.2% of those cases that made it to
step two—were deemed unreasonable even though the court found the statute to be ambiguous as to the question at issue.
What happens at step one is perhaps even more noteworthy. Courts
decided 30.0% of interpretations at Chevron’s step one. This finding is consistent with Kerr’s earlier finding that circuit courts resolved 27.2% of Chevron deference interpretations at step one.185 But step-one resolution did not
mean that the agency lost. Our data indicated that the agencies still prevailed
39.0% of the time, meaning that the agency’s interpretation was the only
possible one under the statute. Our finding, once again, is similar to the
42.0% win rate Kerr found.186 This number is roughly the same as the
agency-win rate when the circuits reviewed interpretations de novo (38.5%).
Nevertheless, limited data on the Supreme Court differ. Tom Merrill
found that the Court resolved matters in agencies’ favor 59.0% of the time at
step one over seven Terms,187 significantly more often than the circuit courts
in our study. To put these numbers in perspective, Figure 1 is reproduced
here as Figure 3, but now with Chevron step one and step two broken out
into distinct standards.
These findings concerning Chevron step one—where the Court finds
that the statute has only one clear meaning—are important for at least two
reasons. First, a step-one ruling in favor of the agency cements the agency’s
current interpretation in place, such that subsequent presidential administrations will not be able to change positions. Nor may the agency change
positions based on changed circumstances short of statutory amendment.
Second, these findings suggest that the circuit courts may well be taking the
Brand X Court’s lesson that they clarify the nature of their holding to ensure
that the agency knows whether it has discretion (or not) to change its statutory interpretation in the future.188

184. Compare Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 Va. L. Rev. 597, 598 (2009), with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two
Steps, 95 Va. L. Rev. 611, 612–13 (2009), Re, supra note 136, at 608–09, and Christopher J.
Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A
Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 Admin. L. Rev. 139, 174 n.163 (2012).
185. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 31 fig.A (noting that 69 interpretations were resolved at
step one out of 253 interpretations or 27.2%).
186. Id.
187. Merrill, supra note 10, at 981 tbl.1 (considering decisions from 1984 to 1990).
188. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”). We anticipate further investigating the effect of Brand X in
future work.
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Figure 3. Agency-Win Rates by Deference Standard, Including
Chevron Steps One and Two (n=1558)
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C. Rulemaking Versus Adjudication
As detailed in Section I.B.1, a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions has
suggested that the formality of the agency procedure may affect the level of
deference accorded to the agency statutory interpretation. Moreover, those
decisions suggest that all legislative rulemaking and formal adjudication
should be treated similarly. The scholarship and empirical studies on point
are plentiful. Our dataset sheds substantial empirical light on the role of
formality in Chevron in the circuit courts.
1. Agency Procedure and Overall Agency-Win Rates
Roughly a third (36.5%) of the 1,558 interpretations in the dataset resulted from notice-and-comment rulemaking and another third from formal adjudication (36.1%).189 Only 4 (0.3%) agency interpretations arose in
formal rulemaking (rulemaking required by statute to be “on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing”190)—a finding that reinforces the
189. In this latter category, we included immigration adjudications and similar adversarial
adjudications where courts have consistently applied Chevron deference, even if they are not
APA-defined formal adjudications—that is, adjudications that a statute requires to be “on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). In this Section, we
break out immigration decisions at times to demonstrate their impact on the overall findings,
especially as immigration accounts for nearly a third (30.6%) of the total dataset.
190. Id. § 553(c).
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well-settled understanding that formal rulemaking “has become almost extinct” since 1973.191 The remaining interpretations (24.8%) involved some
sort of informal adjudication. Due to difficulty in coding as rulemaking or
adjudication, the 37 FERC interpretations (2.4%) were treated as a separate
category in the dataset and not addressed in the following discussion.192
Perhaps in light of the Supreme Court’s focus on procedural formality,
it should be no surprise that agencies win nearly three-fourths of the time
when their interpretation is the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking
(72.8%) or formal adjudication (74.7%). By contrast, the win rate falls to
65.0% when an agency uses a less formal means. (The win rate for formal
rulemaking is only 50.0%, but with only 4 interpretations in the dataset, one
should read little, if anything, into that finding.) Figure 4 depicts these
findings.193
Among the 562 interpretations from formal adjudication, however,
there are 386 immigration interpretations, whose agency-win rate is lower
(70.2%). If those interpretations are removed, the agency-win rate in formal
adjudication rises to 84.7%—more than ten percentage points greater than
the rate for informal rulemaking.194

191. Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 Ohio St. L.J. 237, 253 (2014)
(discussing United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)).
192. We return to the FERC interpretations in Part V in the agency-by-agency analysis.
193. By comparison, among the Skidmore-only cases, 50 of the 55 interpretations dealt
with agency interpretations made in a less-formal means, with the remaining 5 interpretations
dealing with agency interpretations in formal adjudications. Agencies prevailed in 62.0% of
informal interpretations (31 of 50) and 40.0% of interpretations made in formal adjudication
(2 of 5).
194. Schuck and Elliott’s data are not easy to compare to ours because they considered all
administrative decisions on direct review—whether legal or factual—and coded only remand
rates to the agency, regardless of whether the courts agreed with an agency’s statutory interpretation, if any. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 17, at 990 (noting that the coded decisions
concerned agency actions on direct review and discussing criticism for case-selection and remand-variable methodology). But their data also indicated that agency adjudications prevailed
more often in the circuit courts than rulemakings in three separate time periods: 1965, 1975,
and 1984–1985. Id. at 1021–22. A key difference, however, is that the comparative win rates
were more disparate when the rates for the three time periods were combined: 57.8% for
adjudications and 43.9% for rulemakings. See id. at 1022. This difference may not be surprising because many of the adjudications would presumably have presented only factual matters
for judicial review under very deferential substantial-evidence or arbitrary-and-capricious
standards. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
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Figure 4. Agency-Win Rates by Agency Procedure (n=1521)
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Our results for rulemakings and informal interpretations are similar to
those that Eskridge and Baer found for the Supreme Court. They found that
legislative rules and executive orders prevailed 72.5% of the time under all
deference regimes combined,195 which is almost the exact same as our finding of 72.8% in the circuit courts. Similarly, our agency-win rate for informal interpretations of 65.0% in the circuit courts is similar to theirs of
68.1% in the Supreme Court.196
But findings concerning formal adjudication significantly differ. In contrast to our finding that agencies prevailed slightly more often in formal
adjudication (74.7% including immigration cases and 84.7% without them)
than in informal rulemaking (72.8%), Eskridge and Baer found that agency
interpretations in formal adjudication prevailed in the Supreme Court only
65.4% of the time, slightly less than the win rate of 72.5% for agency interpretations from rulemakings.197 Likewise, our findings indicated that, depending on whether one includes immigration interpretations, agency
195. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1147, 1148 tbl.17.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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interpretations from formal adjudication prevailed slightly or significantly
more often than the overall agency-win rate for all formats (71.4%) in the
circuit courts. Eskridge and Baer found the opposite, with the agency-win
rate from formal adjudication in the Supreme Court slightly below the average win rate (68.8%).198 Although the nearly ten-percentage-point difference
between our formal adjudication agency-win rates (our 74.7% to their
65.4%) is meaningful by itself, it is perhaps more appropriate to compare
our 84.7% finding that excluded immigration decisions with their 65.4%
finding because Eskridge and Baer indicated (without percentages or absolute numbers) that the two largest groups of formal adjudications that they
considered were from the NLRB and the FLRA.199 If these are the more appropriate comparative groups, then the difference in agency-win rates in formal adjudication increases by nearly twenty percentage points between the
circuit courts and the Supreme Court.
2. Agency Procedure and Chevron
Turning to whether the courts applied Chevron deference, we found that
the data, depicted in Figure 5, are consistent with what one would expect
from the Supreme Court precedent in one respect but not another. The
findings are consistent with Mead in that formal interpretations receive
Chevron deference at higher rates than informal interpretations, but they are
inconsistent with expectations that rulemaking and formal adjudication are
treated the same.
As detailed in Figure 5, the circuit courts applied the Chevron framework in 91.9% of notice-and-comment rulemakings and in all 4 formal
rulemakings in the dataset. For formal adjudication, however, courts applied
the Chevron deference framework to only 76.7% of interpretations. Not surprisingly based on Mead and Christensen’s preference for formal interpretations, the rate dropped significantly below 50% for informal interpretations
(44.8%). (Nonetheless, although the Court had indicated in those cases that
Chevron’s application would be rare for informal interpretations, the circuit
courts apply Chevron nearly half the time.) Thus, formal interpretations (all
rulemakings and formal adjudication) obtained the Chevron framework
more frequently than informal interpretations. But notice-and-comment
rulemaking obtained the Chevron framework fifteen percentage points more
frequently than formal adjudication, despite their doctrinal parity under
Mead.
198. Id.
199. See id. (“Almost half of the formal adjudications reaching the Court come in labor
cases (primarily orders from the NLRB and the Federal Labor Relations Authority).”). When
we considered the FLRA’s and NLRB’s agency-win rates under formal adjudication, those rates
in the circuit courts were higher than the average win rate for formal adjudication in the
Supreme Court (65.4%). The 4 FLRA interpretations in our database all came from formal
adjudication, and the agency had a 75.0% win rate. Of the NLRB’s 32 interpretations, 26 of
them occurred in formal adjudication, and the NLRB had a win rate of 88.5% (winning 23 of
26).
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Again, however, if the 386 immigration adjudications were removed
from the formal adjudication category,200 the frequency of applying Chevron
deference to formal adjudications would rise nearly ten percentage points to
85.2% and bring the formal formats into closer parity. The difference between immigration decisions and other agencies’ formal adjudication likely
arises in part because many immigration decisions are affirmed by only one
Board of Immigration Appeals member (instead of the entire board), a procedure for which most circuit courts refuse to give Chevron deference.201 By
excluding immigration interpretations for which the BIA has an idiosyncratic review process, the Chevron-application differential between informal
rulemaking and formal adjudication significantly shrinks to fewer than
seven percentage points.
Figure 5. Frequency of Application of Chevron Framework Based
on Agency Format (n=1521)
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That Chevron deference applies almost as often to agency statutory interpretations promulgated in formal adjudication (when excluding immigration proceedings) as in notice-and-comment rulemaking may have
important implications for administrative law. The Court has repeatedly
held, most notably in SEC v. Chenery, that agencies have extremely broad
discretion to choose whether to engage in rulemaking or adjudication.202 In
200. The circuit courts applied Chevron in 72.8% of immigration adjudications (281 of
386 interpretations). Of those 281 cases, the agency won 79.4% of the time.
201. See Lawson, supra note 51, at 591 (citing De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen., 622 F.3d
341, 349–51 (3d Cir. 2010)) (discussing split in circuit courts over whether to apply Chevron
to decision from only one member of the BIA).
202. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947). Lower courts have rarely found that an agency abuses its discretion in
selecting formats. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1383, 1408 (2004).
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deciding whether to use rulemaking or adjudication, the agency may consider various factors, such as the benefits of case-by-case development, the
novelty of the issue, or time constraints in fashioning an interpretation.203
But agencies may also ponder whether they will pay a price in using formal
adjudication instead of rulemaking. Our findings indicate that they may pay
only a slight price—with a slightly lower rate of obtaining Chevron—for
choosing formal adjudication (at least without idiosyncratic procedures).
But this small price seems worth it when one considers the better
agency-win rates for formal adjudication once the circuit courts apply Chevron. As detailed in Figure 6, formal-adjudication win rates increased to
81.7% when Chevron applied, compared to a 74.7% overall win rate for
formal adjudications and a 51.9% formal-adjudication win rate when Chevron did not apply. Indeed, if the 281 immigration adjudications to which
Chevron applied were excluded, the win rate would rise to 86.0% (compared
to 81.3% under all standards of review combined). Notably, Kerr found in
his study of circuit courts in 1995 and 1996 that agency interpretations from
adjudication (of all formality stripes) prevailed 72% of the time under Chevron, a rate of almost ten or fourteen percentage points below our findings.204
Conversely, our win rates for notice-and-comment rulemaking under Chevron and under all scopes of review were about the same: 74.4% under Chevron and 72.8% overall (though only 54.3% when Chevron did not apply).
This win rate is similar to the 74% that Kerr found for prevailing rulemakings on direct review in his study.205
The difference in agency-win rates between formal adjudication (81.7%
with all subject matter, or 86.0% without immigration) and notice-andcomment rulemaking (74.4%), seemingly absent in Kerr’s earlier findings,
may cause agencies to consider adopting Chevron-eligible agency statutory
interpretations in formal adjudication as opposed to the more time- and
resource-intensive notice-and-comment rulemaking.206 As a caveat, our data
do not take into account whether the agency is less or more aggressive in its
interpretations depending on whether the agency uses formal adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, although we have no reason to think
that agency behavior differs. Because of the higher agency-win rate with formal adjudication, formal adjudication may well be the better option for
agencies in more cases than agencies may first surmise.

203. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202–03.
204. Kerr, supra note 17, at 30 n.138.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 Geo. L.J. 943 (2017) (exploring how the elimination of Auer deference could lead agencies to use adjudication more to
adopt Chevron-eligible statutory interpretations, as opposed to notice-and-comment
rulemaking).
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Figure 6. Agency-Win Rates by Agency Procedure with and
Without Chevron Framework (n=1521)
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Agency adjudication has had a rough go of it the past few decades.
Rulemaking has increased in popularity as adjudication has come under fire
for its comparative downsides207: it is less efficient because it does not address numerous issues at once, is less appropriate for determining “legislative” facts with input from numerous interpreted persons,208 provides caseby-case decisions that provide less prospective notice, 209 relies on enforcement actions for compliance that may not be necessary for existing rules,210
targets one regulated party as a test case and creates a retroactive norm, 211

207. See Magill, supra note 202, 1398 & n.44; Schuck & Elliott, supra note 17, at 1013–14.
208. See Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of
the Trial, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 473, 479 (2003). Magill describes the nearly unanimous scholarly
consensus against adjudication in the 1970s. See Magill, supra note 202, at 1403 n.69.
209. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 208, at 480.
210. See id. at 480–81.
211. See Magill, supra note 202, at 1396.
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provides agencies less agenda control depending on how matters are docketed,212 and provides a less audible “fire-alarm” to enable congressional oversight.213 Both formal and informal adjudication face existential attacks based
on their fairness to regulated parties.214
Nonetheless, adjudication has numerous benefits. Aside from those
mentioned in Chenery II,215 adjudication permits agencies to escape review
by the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and thus
obtain more independence,216 conserves more onerous rulemaking resources
by using adjudication, allows agencies to act in an incremental way with a
light regulatory touch,217 provides broad participation by interested parties,218 permits retroactive standard setting when necessary,219 avoids onerous congressionally imposed constraints on rulemaking,220 and has more
flexibility than it is often given credit for.221 And our data suggest that there
is one more to add: better agency-win rates under Chevron.222
212. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1414, 1472–73 (2012).
213. See Bressman, supra note 80, at 2043–45.
214. See generally Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1643,
1670–86 (2016) (discussing recent concerns over fairness in both informal and formal
adjudication).
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
216. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1162–63 (2014).
217. See Magill, supra note 202, at 1396–97; see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political
Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev.
889, 896 (2008) (noting that agencies’ increased use of less formal interpretations suggests
“that there are considerable costs to notice-and-comment rulemaking”). Indeed, one study
found that the EPA’s significant notice-and-comment rules took three to five years to promulgate, and 75% of those rules were challenged in court. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s
Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767, 771
(2008). But Anne O’Connell found that other agencies are significantly speedier. See
O’Connell, supra, at 958–59.
218. See Magill, supra note 202, at 1440.
219. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L.
Rev. 59, 76 (1995).
220. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency
Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 181 (2013) (“However, if rulemaking becomes impossible because of the constraints of the REINS Act, agencies may be compelled to
use adjudication instead.”).
221. See Barnett, supra note 214, at 1700–01 (citing William Funk, The Rise and Purported
Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 881, 892 (2006)) (describing flexibility for
formal adjudication under the APA).
222. Our review of eleven leading administrative law casebooks indicates that the relationship of (1) agency choice between notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication,
and (2) deference or agency-win rates has gone unnoticed. None of the texts addressed this
relationship in either their discussion of Mead or Chenery II. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford,
Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 2010); Kristin E. Hickman & Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Federal Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (2010); Lawson, supra
note 51; John M. Rogers et al., Administrative Law (3d ed. 2012).
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Although we do not enter the rulemaking–adjudication debate here, our
findings that agencies prevailed more frequently under Chevron in adjudication than rulemaking may matter to agencies. One of us previously surveyed
128 agency rule drafters.223 Among more than twenty interpretive tools included in the survey, Chevron deference was reported by most agency rule
drafters (90.0%) as being used when interpreting statutes and drafting regulations.224 The vast majority of agency rule drafters surveyed thinks about
judicial review when interpreting statutes and views their chances of prevailing in court as better under Chevron. “Indeed, two in five rule drafters
agreed or strongly agreed—and another two in five somewhat agreed—that
a federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive efforts if it is confident
that Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or de novo review) applies.”225 To be sure, one must be cautious in drawing strong inferences from these data because the “somewhat agree” (as opposed to agree or
strongly agree) responses predominated and some volunteered comments
discounted the effect of judicial review.226 Moreover, these drafters were not
addressing whether the presence of agency-win rates would alter agency formats. But they are candid indications that agencies think about standards of
review and that those standards may affect their statutory interpretations.
Finally, it is worth noting the differences in agency-win rates for informal interpretations. The overall agency-win rate for informal interpretations
was 65.0%. But when the circuit courts applied Chevron, the win rate rose to
78.6%—near the rate for formal adjudication (81.7%) and slightly better
than notice-and-comment rulemaking (74.4%). And, when the courts refused to apply Chevron deference to informal interpretations, the win rate
dropped to 54.0%, which again is similar to the win rate without Chevron
for notice-and-comment rulemaking (54.3%) and formal adjudication
(51.9%). Although our findings here do not demonstrate what relationship
the review standards and the agency-win rates have, these findings, along
with our findings concerning the application of Chevron to informal interpretations, suggest that agencies should seek Chevron deference for every
interpretation, regardless of its formality. Although Christensen and Mead
both suggested that Chevron’s application to informal interpretations would
be rare, our findings indicate that courts apply the Chevron framework, if
not as a matter of course, almost half the time (44.8%) in decisions in which
the Court referred to Chevron. This is especially true, as we shall see, when
the litigation is in the D.C. Circuit.227 And when courts applied the framework, the agency-win rate was extremely high, higher than that for even
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Again, however, our data do not allow us
223. Walker, supra note 94, at 703–04.
224. Walker, supra note 153, at 1020 fig.2.
225. Id. at 1059–65; see also Walker, supra note 94, at 721–28, 722 fig.3 (exploring these
findings in greater detail).
226. See Walker, supra note 94, at 722–28.
227. See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text.
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to account for whether the agency is less or more aggressive in its interpretive efforts depending on the level of formality involved in the regulatory
effort.
IV. Findings on Circuit Disparities
As reported in Section III.A, our findings suggest that standards of review matter for agency statutory interpretations. Recall that the overall
agency-win rate for the 1,558 interpretations—regardless of the deference
standard applied—was 71.4%. Recall, too, that the agency-win rate increased to 77.4% for the 1,166 interpretations subject to the Chevron framework, which was significantly higher than the rate under Skidmore (56.0%)
and de novo review (38.5%). These findings provide some support that
Chevron deference matters in the federal circuit courts. In other words, there
may well be a Chevron Supreme and a Chevron Regular. But disaggregating
the data by circuit, as depicted in Figure 7, complicates this story.
Figure 7. Overall Agency-Win Rates by Circuit (n=1558)
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As detailed in Figure 7, the overall agency-win rates varied significantly
by circuit. The most deferential circuit was the First Circuit (82.8%), followed by the Tenth (78.5%) and Eleventh (75.5%) Circuits. The two circuits
that specialize in administrative law—the D.C. (72.6%) and Federal (73.2%)
Circuits—are right around the mean (71.4%) and median (72.2%). The
least deferential was the Ninth Circuit (65.8%), followed by the Fifth
(67.8%), Sixth (69.0%), and Third (69.9%) Circuits.228 These results may
228. By comparison, the Skidmore-only cases are spread across ten of the circuits with the
following agency-win rates by circuit: 55.6% in Second Circuit (9 total interpretations); 66.7%
in the Third Circuit (3 interpretations); 80.0% in the Fourth Circuit (5 interpretations); 66.7%
in the Fifth Circuit (3 interpretations); 50.0% in the Sixth Circuit (6 interpretations); 100.0%
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not be too surprising based on one’s intuitions about the circuits and their
reputations vis-à-vis the federal government.
Perhaps some of the agency-win rates differ in the circuits based on
subject matter, but subject matter or other effects require careful inquiry in
future work. For instance, we intuitively—and it turns out correctly—
thought that the Ninth Circuit’s large number of immigration cases likely
affected the agency-win rate. Indeed, agencies prevailed in immigration
cases 55.9% of the time in the Ninth Circuit, ten percentage points fewer
than in all cases within the Ninth Circuit (65.8%). Put differently, when
immigration cases are excluded, the agency-win rate in the Ninth Circuit
rises to 73.8%, much more in line with the median and mean circuit. By
contrast, the agency-win rates in immigration cases were significantly higher
in other circuits that also had large number of immigration cases: 82.4% in
the Fifth Circuit, 73.2% in the Second Circuit, and 70.9% in the Third Circuit. Notably, the Fifth Circuit’s overall agency-win rate (67.8%) was significantly lower than its agency-win rate in only immigration matters (82.4%).
In the Second and Third Circuits, the overall and immigration-specific
agency-win rates were nearly identical. Other factors, such as political valence and panel effects, appear to have more influence. The key point is that
readers should keep in mind that more sophisticated analysis is necessary to
understand why various circuit disparities exist.
Assessing the circuits based on the frequency at which they applied the
Chevron framework paints a somewhat different picture, as depicted in Figure 8. As to the frequency of Chevron’s application, five circuits were well
above the average (74.8%) and median circuit (73.2%). The D.C. Circuit led
the way by applying the Chevron standard to 88.6% of interpretations, followed by the First (87.9%), Eighth (85.7%), Federal (84.6%), and Fourth
(80.6%) Circuits. The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, applied Chevron the least
frequently, only 60.7% of the time. Five other circuits were below 70%.

in the Eighth Circuit (2 interpretations); 50.0% in the Ninth Circuit (12 interpretations); 25%
in the Tenth Circuit (4 interpretations); 100.0% in the D.C. Circuit (1 interpretation); and
70.0% in the Federal Circuit (10 interpretations).
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Figure 8. Frequency of Application of Chevron Framework by
Circuit (n=1558)
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And inside these Chevron-application statistics is another fascinating
finding. The “Mead Puzzle” arises from the difficulty lower courts have had
in determining whether informal interpretations have the force of law and
thus are entitled to Chevron deference.229 All but two circuits refused to apply Chevron to informal interpretations (at least when the court referred to
Chevron) more than 50% of the time.230 And the median circuit rate was
36.8%.
But the D.C. Circuit, a Chevron early adopter, applied the Chevron
framework to informal interpretations 80.7% of the time, nearly twenty-five
percentage points more often than the next circuit (the Eighth Circuit, at
57.1%), more than forty percentage points more than the median circuit,
and approximately sixty-five percentage points more than the circuit least
likely to apply Chevron in these cases (the Second Circuit, at 16.2%). Accordingly, the circuit that reviewed the most agency interpretations in our
dataset does not appear to have found the “Mead Puzzle” enigmatic. This

229. See supra Section I.B.1.
230. Here is the breakdown of the rate at which an informal interpretation received the
Chevron framework, from greatest to least: D.C. Circuit (80.7%, n=88), Eighth Circuit (57.1%,
n=14), First Circuit (42.9%, n=7), Third Circuit (41.4%, n=29), Tenth Circuit (40.0%, n=20),
Ninth Circuit (39.7%, n=63), Sixth Circuit (36.8%, n=38), Fourth Circuit (31.3%, n=16),
Seventh Circuit (30.8%, n=13), Fifth Circuit (29.2%, n=24), Eleventh Circuit (28.0%, n=25),
Federal Circuit (25.0%, n=12), and Second Circuit (16.2%, n=37).
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finding bolsters our early conclusion that agencies should seek Chevron deference even for informal interpretations;231 not doing so in the D.C. Circuit
borders on malpractice.
But to appreciate the circuit-by-circuit effect of Chevron deference (regardless of an interpretation’s formality), one needs to compare the agency’s
win rate overall with its win rate when courts applied the Chevron framework. The average win-rate difference for the dataset is six percentage
points, with an overall win rate of 71.4% compared to a win rate of 77.4%
when the court applied the Chevron deference framework.
Several circuits were dramatic outliers with respect to win-rate differential. The greatest difference came from the Sixth Circuit, where the overall
win rate was 69.0%, whereas the win rate when Chevron applied was
88.2%—nearly twenty percentage points higher. Agency-win rates in the
Second (72.5% to 83.2%) and Seventh (72.0% to 83.7%) Circuits were also
more than ten percentage points higher when Chevron applied. In those circuits, it was harder to obtain Chevron deference, but, once obtained, the
agency’s chances of winning improved considerably. Conversely, the winrate differential was within three percentage points in six of the thirteen
circuits: the First (82.8% to 84.3%), Eighth (75.5% to 76.2%), Tenth (78.5%
to 81.3%), Eleventh (70.4% to 73.1%), D.C. (72.6% to 75.4%), and Federal
(73.2% to 76.0%) Circuits. In other words, in those circuits, whether Chevron applies does not seem to meaningfully affect agency-win rates.
Of course, that may not be the correct inference from these data. For
many of these circuits where there was little difference in win rate, that is
because the court applied Chevron deference at such a high rate that the
Chevron win rate and overall win rate were basically the same. Such a win
rate could be the result of those circuits having imbued Chevron’s deference
principles into judicial decisionmaking. Figure 9 attempts to tease out those
nuances by comparing the win rate under Chevron versus the win rate when
Chevron does not apply. The circuits are ordered left to right in Figure 9
starting with the circuits with the greatest difference with and without Chevron. The overall win rate when Chevron applied was 77.4%, as noted above.
When Chevron did not apply, however, the win rate plummeted nearly
twenty-five percentage points to 53.6%.
For the six circuits whose differential between win rates overall and win
rates under Chevron were within three percentage points (First, Eighth,
Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits), the numbers are quite different
when comparing win rates with and without Chevron’s application. The differential in the D.C. Circuit, for instance, was over twenty percentage points
(75.4% to 51.4%). Of all thirteen circuits, the Eighth Circuit (76.2% to
71.4%) was the only outlier with a difference of less than five percentage
points, with the only other under ten percentage points being the Eleventh
Circuit—just barely (73.1% to 63.2%). And, before leaving Figure 9, we note
that the largest differences were striking: 48.8 percentage points in the Sixth
231. See supra Section III.C.
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Circuit, 36.5 points in the Fourth Circuit, 33.7 points in the Seventh Circuit,
and 31.5 points for the Second Circuit.
Figure 9. Circuit-by-Circuit Comparison of Win Rates with and
Without Chevron Framework (n=1558)
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To compare circuits, it is perhaps helpful to create a composite score of
the three indicators of deference in our dataset: overall agency-win rate; frequency of Chevron framework; and win rate when Chevron applied. Table 1
takes the average of these three percentages and turns that into a composite
score on a ten-point scale—with 10.00 being a perfectly deferential score
where the agency always wins and the court always applies Chevron deference, and 0.00 being a perfectly nondeferential score where the agency never
wins and the court never applies Chevron. The circuit rankings for each of
the three deference indicators are provided in parentheses.
Utilizing these composite scores, the First Circuit (8.38 out of 10.00)
emerges as the most deferential circuit, followed by the Eighth (7.91), D.C.
(7.89), Federal (7.79), and Fourth (7.74) Circuits. On the other end of the
spectrum, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits (6.85) tie as the least deferential circuits, followed by the Third (7.21) and Eleventh (7.22) Circuits.
Prior studies have not considered similar circuit effects. But these effects
can be meaningful for agencies and litigating parties. For instance, if an
agency seeks to bring an enforcement action to test one of its statutory interpretations, the Ninth Circuit may not be the best place to do so. Moreover, if
the agency is worried about receiving Chevron deference, the Eighth Circuit
is a promising venue because agency-win rates are similar with or without
Chevron. Or, if the agency is confident that it will receive Chevron deference,
the Sixth Circuit appears promising because agencies have the highest win
rates under Chevron in that circuit. Of course, these strategic decisions
should involve more considerations, including the ideological valence of the
advanced interpretation, the subject matter, the agency, and the regulated
parties at issue. We investigate some of these findings in the next Part.
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Table 1. Circuit-by-Circuit Composite Deference Scores
C o m p o s ite
S c o re

O v e ra ll W in
R a te

C h e v ro n
A p p lie d

C h e v ro n W in
R a te

1 . F irst C ircu it (n = 5 8 )

8 .3 8

8 2 .8 % (1 )

8 4 .3 % (2 )

8 4 .3 % (2 )

2 . E ig h th C ircu it (n = 4 9 )

7 .9 1

7 5 .5 % (3 )

8 5 .7 % (3 )

7 6 .2 % (7 )

3 . D .C . C ircu it (n = 3 0 7 )

7 .8 9

7 2 .6 % (5 )

8 8 .6 % (1 )

7 5 .4 % (9 )

4 . F e d e ra l C ircu it (n = 1 2 3 )

7 .7 9

7 3 .2 % (4 )

8 4 .6 % (4 )

7 6 .0 % (8 )

5 . F o u rth C ircu it (n = 7 2 )

7 .7 4

7 2 .2 % (7 )

8 0 .6 % (5 )

7 9 .3 % (5 )

6 . T e n th C ircu it (n = 6 5 )

7 .5 1

7 8 .5 % (2 )

7 3 .8 % (6 )

7 3 .1 % (1 1 )

7 . S e co n d C ircu it (n = 1 7 1 )

7 .3 9

7 2 .5 % (6 )

6 6 .1 % (1 0 )

8 3 .2 % (4 )

U .S . C o u rt o f A p p e a ls

8 . S e ve n th C ircu it (n = 7 5 )

7 .3 7

7 2 .0 % (8 )

6 5 .3 % (1 1 )

8 3 .7 % (3 )

9 . S ixth C ircu it (n = 8 4 )

7 .2 7

6 9 .0 % (1 1 )

6 0 .7 % (1 3 )

8 8 .2 % (1 )

1 0 . E le ve n th C ircu it (n = 7 1 )

7 .2 2

7 0 .4 % (9 )

7 3 .2 % (7 )

7 3 .1 % (1 2 )

1 1 . T h ird C ircu it (n = 1 3 3 )

7 .2 1

6 9 .9 % (1 0 )

6 9 .9 % (8 )

7 6 .3 % (6 )

1 2 . F ifth C ircu it (n = 8 7 )

6 .8 5

6 7 .8 % (1 2 )

6 4 .4 % (1 2 )

7 3 .2 % (1 0 )

1 2 . N in th C ircu it (n = 2 6 3 )

6 .8 5

6 5 .8 % (1 3 )

6 7 .3 % (9 )

7 2 .3 % (1 2 )

V. Findings on Agency and Subject-Matter Differences
Just as the circuit disparities discussed in Part IV complicate the story
regarding Chevron in the circuit courts, so do the differences uncovered in
Chevron’s application by subject matter and agency. This Part turns to those
findings. Section V.A explores differences based on subject matter, whereas
Section V.B looks at agency-by-agency disparities. Section V.C focuses on
the differences between executive and independent agencies. Our purpose
here is to provide an overview of the data and brief discussions of the most
noticeable findings. We leave for future work (whether ours or others’) to
dive into the findings for individual subject matters and agencies.
A. Subject-Matter Differences
Differences in agency-deference rates based on subject matter are particularly interesting in light of the extensive focus of late in the literature and
the real world on administrative law exceptionalism—“the misperception
that a particular regulatory field is so different from the rest of the regulatory state that general administrative law principles do not apply.”232
To better appreciate differences based on subject matter, Table 2
presents the composite scores for all subject matters where there were at
least ten agency interpretations in the dataset. This composite score is based
on the same methodology used as that for ranking circuits in Part IV, with
the three indicators of deference in our dataset weighted equally: overall win
232. Walker, supra note 107, at 149.
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rate; frequency of Chevron framework; and win rate when Chevron applied.
Table 2 takes the average of these three percentages and turns that into a
composite score on a ten-point scale—with 10.00 being a perfectly deferential score where the agency always wins and the court always applies Chevron
deference and 0.00 being a perfectly nondeferential score where the agency
never wins and the court never applies the Chevron standard. The rankings
for each indicator are provided in parentheses.
Table 2. Subject-Matter Composite Deference Scores
S u b je c t M a tte r

n

C o m p o s ite O v e ra ll W in
S c o re
R a te

C h e v ro n
A p p lie d

C h e v ro n
W in R a te

1 . T e le co m m u n ica tio n s

81

8 .6 7

8 2 .5 % (3 )

8 8 .8 % (3 )

8 8 .7 % (3 )

2 . In d ia n A ffa irs

15

8 .3 3

8 6 .7 % (1 )

8 0 .0 % (7 )

8 3 .3 % (7 )

3 . F e d e ra l G o ve rn m e n t

11

8 .1 8

7 2 .7 % (1 2 ) 1 0 0 .0 % (1 )

4 . P e n sio n s

17

8 .1 7

7 6 .5 % (8 )

7 6 .5 % (1 0 ) 9 2 .3 % (1 )

5 . E d u ca tio n

21

8 .1 5

8 1 .0 % (4 )

7 6 .2 % (1 1 ) 8 7 .5 % (4 )

6 . H e a lth a n d S a fe ty

47

8 .1 4

8 3 .0 % (2 )

7 0 .2 % (1 7 ) 9 0 .9 % (2 )

7 . E n title m e n t P ro g ra m s

139

8 .0 3

7 9 .1 % (6 )

7 8 .4 % (9 )

8 . T ra n sp o rta tio n

43

7 .8 2

7 9 .1 % (6 )

7 4 .4 % (1 2 ) 8 1 .3 % (9 )

9 . A n tid u m p in g /T ra d e

52

7 .7 4

7 5 .0 % (9 )

8 2 .7 % (5 )

1 0 . In te lle ctu a l P ro p e rty

27

7 .6 0

7 4 .1 % (1 1 )

7 4 .1 % (1 3 ) 8 0 .0 % (1 0 )

1 1 . B u sin e ss R e g u la tio n

53

7 .5 7

7 9 .2 % (5 )

6 0 .4 % (1 9 ) 8 7 .5 % (4 )

1 2 . E n viro n m e n t

216

7 .5 5

7 0 .8 % (1 3 )

8 4 .3 % (4 )

7 1 .4 % (1 8 )

1 3 . C rim in a l L a w

10

7 .5 0

7 0 .0 % (1 4 )

8 0 .0 % (7 )

7 5 .0 % (1 5 )

1 4 . A g ricu ltu re

21

7 .4 7

6 6 .7 % (1 7 )

8 1 .0 % (6 )

7 6 .5 % (1 4 )

1 5 . L a b o r/C o lle ct. B a rg .

62

7 .3 4

7 4 .2 % (1 0 )

6 9 .4 % (1 6 ) 7 6 .7 % (1 3 )

1 6 . Im m ig ra tio n

478

7 .2 4

6 7 .9 % (1 6 )

7 2 .3 % (1 5 ) 7 6 .8 % (1 1 )

1 7 . E n e rg y

50

7 .2 1

6 0 .0 % (2 0 )

9 6 .0 % (2 )

1 8 . E m p lo ym e n t

84

6 .9 6

6 5 .5 % (1 8 )

6 6 .7 % (1 8 ) 7 6 .8 % (1 2 )

19. Tax

48

6 .7 4

6 4 .6 % (1 9 )

5 6 .3 % (2 1 ) 8 1 .5 % (8 )

2 0 . P riso n s

19

6 .6 4

6 8 .4 % (1 5 )

7 3 .7 % (1 4 ) 5 7 .1 % (2 2 )

2 1 . H o u sin g

25

6 .0 4

6 0 .0 % (2 0 )

5 2 .0 % (2 2 ) 6 9 .2 % (2 0 )

2 2 . C ivil R ig h ts

12

5 .9 9

5 0 .0 % (2 2 )

5 8 .3 % (2 0 ) 7 1 .4 % (1 8 )

7 2 .7 % (1 7 )

8 3 .5 % (6 )

7 4 .4 % (1 6 )

6 0 .4 % (2 1 )

As Table 2 indicates, the subject matters for which courts defer most
often to agency interpretations included telecommunications (8.67), Indian
affairs (8.33), federal government (8.18), pensions (8.17), education (8.15),
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health and safety (8.14), and entitlement programs (8.03). Conversely, the
subject matters for which courts defer the least were civil rights (5.99), followed by housing (6.04), prisons (6.64), tax (6.74), and employment (6.96).
The findings depicted in Table 2 merit article-length treatment and further exploration. But this Section merely highlights a few noteworthy findings. For instance, it perhaps should come as no surprise that tax ranks
nineteen out of twenty-two in light of entrenched tax exceptionalism. At
56.3%, moreover, tax was second to last in the rate at which circuit courts
applied Chevron deference. Indeed, it was not until 2011 that the Supreme
Court announced that certain IRS interpretations are entitled to Chevron
deference233—a position that the Supreme Court may have qualified last year
in King v. Burwell, at least with respect to questions of deep political or
economic significance.234 Similarly, it is perhaps no surprise to see immigration in the latter half of the rankings in light of the current discussion regarding immigration exceptionalism.235
The range of circuit-court deference by subject matter is also worth underscoring. For instance, the overall agency-win rate ranged from 86.7% for
Indian affairs to 50.0% for civil rights. 236 The rate of circuit courts applying
Chevron deference ranged from 100.0% for federal government matters to
52.0% for housing. Similarly, when circuit courts applied the Chevron deference framework, agency-win rates ranged from 92.3% for agency interpretations involving pensions (as opposed to an overall win rate of just 76.5% for
pensions) to 57.1% for prisons. (Strangely, agencies were more successful
when Chevron deference did not apply in the prison context, with an overall
68.4% win rate.) These disparities based on subject matter complicate the
findings discussed in Part III regarding how Chevron matters on the ground
in the circuit courts.
The data reveal some differences and similarities between the treatment
of various subject matters in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts. As
for the key differences, Eskridge and Baer reported that interpretations concerning energy had the highest overall agency-win rate of 93.3%,237 but in
the circuit courts the agency prevailed 60.0% of the time, rendering it one of
233. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011). For
more on tax exceptionalism, see, for example, Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006), and Stephanie
Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 221
(2014).
234. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
235. For an overview, see Chris Walker, The Costs of Immigration Exceptionalism, Yale J.
on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-costs-of-immigration-exceptionalism-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cc/HK7M-5VC5].
236. By comparison, the 55 Skidmore-only interpretations arose in 17 different subject
matters, with 5 of those subject matters having at least 5 interpretations. The agency-win rates
for those subject matters are 44.4% for collective bargaining/labor (9 interpretations); 62.5%
for tax (8 interpretations); 88.9% for employment (9 interpretations); 60% for health and
safety (5 interpretations); and 40% for immigration (5 interpretations).
237. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1145 tbl.16.
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the lowest-prevailing agencies. On the flip side, Indian affairs had the second
lowest overall agency-win rate of 51.6% in the Supreme Court,238 but it had
the highest rate of 86.7% in the circuit courts. At the same time, some subject matters performed about the same in the Supreme Court and the circuit
courts: environmental (68.4% and 70.8%, respectively), immigration (67.7%
and 67.9%), business regulation (77.1% and 79.2%), and transportation
(78.6% and 79.1%).239
Contrary to Eskridge and Baer’s conclusion as to the Supreme Court, we
cannot conclude with much confidence that the circuit courts defer based
on notions of their perceived institutional advantage or disadvantage. Eskridge and Baer divided subject matter with at least ten decisions in the
Supreme Court into six categories (foreign affairs, technical and economic
regulation, procedural rules, socioeconomic regulation, criminal law, and
federal governance) and indicated which subject matters within each category performed better and worse than the overall average. 240 They determined that the Supreme Court was generally more deferential to foreign
affairs (despite being less deferential to immigration, one of only two subject
matters in the foreign affairs category, than the overall average), technical
and economic matters, and procedural rules; the Supreme Court was generally less deferential to subject matter in criminal, socioeconomic, and federal
governmental matters. Eskridge and Baer concluded that the justices were
less likely to defer to matters that were not viewed as technical and matters
that the Court thought that it could just as easily answer.241
Our dataset does not tell the same story with as much certainty when we
organize our data similarly to theirs. While the circuit courts’ treatment of
foreign affairs and technical matters are similar to the Supreme Court’s (but
less deferential in each category), the circuit courts do not appear to defer
meaningfully more or less to socioeconomic regulations, and, in fact, they
defer much more to issues concerning the federal government than the Supreme Court. Moreover, although the circuit courts defer less to criminal
matters than the overall average, the agency-win rates in this category
(70.0% for criminal law and 68.4% for prisons) are very close to the average
(71.4%) and higher than the agency-win rate in the Supreme Court (62.3%
for criminal law, the only category there).242
B. Agency-Deference Rankings
Although there is an obvious overlap between analyzing deference based
on subject matter and agency, disaggregating the deference rankings by
agency provides some helpful additional granularity. Table 3 presents the
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1144.
242. Id. at 1145 tbl.16. Our dataset did not include sufficient cases for procedural matters
in the circuit courts.
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composite scores for all agencies with at least ten interpretations in the
dataset. This composite score is based on the same methodology used as that
for ranking circuits in Part IV and subject matters in Section V.A, with the
three indicators of deference in our dataset weighted equally: overall win
rate, frequency of Chevron framework, and win rate when Chevron applied.
Table 3 takes the average of these three percentages and turns that into a
composite score on a ten-point scale. The rankings for each of the three
deference indicators are provided in parentheses.
Similar to subject matters, Table 3 illustrates the disparate win rates by
agency. The ICC/STB was the agency to which the circuit courts most deferred (9.38), followed by the FCC (8.67), Treasury Department (8.37),
NLRB (8.26), Commerce Department (8.18), Defense Department/Armed
Services (8.13), FDA (8.08), and Education Department (8.06). On the other
end, the least-deferred-to agency was the EEOC (5.08), followed by HUD
(5.19), Energy Department (6.21), FTC (6.74), Justice Department (6.77),
IRS (6.78), and Bureau of Prisons (6.79).
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Table 3. Agency-by-Agency Composite Deference Scores
n

C o m p o s ite
S c o re

1 . IC C /S T B

16

9 .3 8

1 0 0 .0 % (1 )

8 1 .3 % (1 0 )

1 0 0 .0 % (1 )

2. FCC

80

8 .6 7

8 2 .5 % (4 )

8 8 .8 % (5 )

8 8 .7 % (3 )

3 . T re a su ry

19

8 .3 7

7 8 .9 % (7 )

7 8 .9 % (1 3 )

9 3 .3 % (2 )

4. N LR B

32

8 .2 6

7 8 .1 % (8 )

8 7 .5 % (6 )

8 2 .1 % (1 1 )

5 . C o m m e rce

46

8 .1 8

7 6 .1 % (1 1 )

8 7 .0 % (7 )

8 2 .5 % (9 )

6 . D e fe n se / A rm e d
F o rce s

23

8 .1 3

8 7 .0 % (3 )

6 9 .6 % (1 9 )

8 7 .5 % (4 )

7. FDA

20

8 .0 8

7 5 .0 % (1 2 )

8 5 .0 % (8 )

8 2 .4 % (1 0 )

8 . E d u ca tio n

20

8 .0 6

8 0 .0 % (5 )

7 5 .0 % (1 5 )

8 6 .7 % (5 )

9. H H S

85

7 .8 9

8 0 .0 % (5 )

7 2 .9 % (1 7 )

8 3 .9 % (7 )

1 0 . V e te ra n s
A d m in istra tio n

27

7 .8 8

7 7 .8 % (9 )

7 7 .8 % (1 4 )

8 1 .0 % (1 3 )

1 1 . IT C

A gency

O v e ra ll W in
R a te

C h e v ro n
A p p lie d

C h e v ro n W in
R a te

11

7 .7 9

7 2 .7 % (1 5 )

9 0 .9 % (2 )

7 0 .0 % (2 0 )

1 2 . In te rio r

31

7 .6 6

7 7 .4 % (1 0 )

7 4 .2 % (1 6 )

7 8 .3 % (1 4 )

13. EPA

159

7 .4 9

6 7 .9 % (2 0 )

8 9 .3 % (4 )

6 7 .6 % (2 1 )

1 4 . A g ricu ltu re

35

7 .4 5

6 8 .6 % (1 9 )

8 0 .0 % (1 1 )

7 5 .0 % (1 7 )

15. SEC

24

7 .4 3

7 5 .0 % (1 2 )

6 6 .7 % (2 2 )

8 1 .3 % (1 2 )

16. FERC

38

7 .3 7

6 0 .5 % (2 4 )

1 0 0 .0 % (1 )

6 0 .5 % (2 6 )

17. O PM

13

7 .3 0

6 1 .5 % (2 3 )

8 4 .6 % (9 )

7 2 .7 % (1 9 )

1 8 . Im m ig ra tio n
A g e n cie s

477

7 .2 3

6 7 .7 % (2 1 )

7 2 .7 % (1 8 )

7 6 .4 % (1 6 )

19. Labor

98

7 .1 4

7 0 .4 % (1 6 )

5 9 .2 % (2 4 )

8 4 .5 % (6 )

2 0 . T ra n sp o rta tio n

26

7 .0 4

6 9 .2 % (1 7 )

6 5 .4 % (2 3 )

7 6 .5 % (1 5 )

2 1 . S o cia l S e cu rity
A d m in istra tio n

13

6 .8 4

6 9 .2 % (1 7 )

6 9 .2 % (2 0 )

6 6 .7 % (2 2 )

19

6 .7 9

7 3 .7 % (1 4 )

6 8 .4 % (2 1 )

6 1 .5 % (2 5 )

2 3 . IR S

45

6 .7 8

6 6 .7 % (2 2 )

5 3 .3 % (2 5 )

8 3 .3 % (8 )

2 4 . Ju stice

29

6 .7 7

5 8 .6 % (2 5 )

7 9 .3 % (1 2 )

6 5 .2 % (2 4 )

25. FTC

11

6 .7 4

9 0 .9 % (2 )

3 6 .4 % (2 8 )

7 5 .0 % (1 7 )

2 6 . E n e rg y

11

6 .2 1

4 5 .5 % (2 7 )

9 0 .9 % (2 )

5 0 .0 % (2 8 )

27. H U D

24

5 .1 9

5 4 .2 % (2 6 )

4 1 .7 % (2 7 )

6 0 .0 % (2 7 )

28. EEO C

14

5 .0 8

4 2 .9 % (2 8 )

4 2 .9 % (2 6 )

6 6 .7 % (2 2 )

2 2 . B u re a u o f P riso n s
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We underscore that these agency composite deference scores have the
potential to mask some of the underlying deference differentials. For instance, the FTC is the fourth-worst agency on the composite score despite
having the second-highest overall win rate (90.9%). That is because circuit
courts applied the Chevron doctrine to only 36.4% of the FTC’s statutory
interpretations; indeed, the FTC’s win rate fell to 75.0% when the circuit
courts applied Chevron.243 (The agency-win rate similarly fell for the ITC
[72.7% to 70.0%] and Bureau of Prisons [73.7% to 61.5%] when Chevron
was applied.)
It is likewise interesting to evaluate the stark disparities between agencies dealing with similar subject matters. For instance, the Energy Department (6.21) was the third worst among the twenty-eight agencies, whereas
the EPA (7.49) ranked thirteenth overall. Although the frequency of Chevron
being applied was somewhat similar (89.3% for the EPA to 90.9% for Energy), there was a difference of more than twenty percentage points in overall agency-win rates (67.9% to 45.5%) and in agency-win rates when
Chevron applied (67.6% to 50.0%). Meanwhile a third energy-related
agency, FERC, always received Chevron deference, but only prevailed 60.5%
of the time—for a composite score (7.37) ranking of sixteen.
Likewise, the Treasury Department (8.37) ranked third overall on the
composite scale, whereas the IRS (6.78), an agency within Treasury,244
ranked twenty-third out of the twenty-eight agencies. This divergence further illustrates the tax-exceptionalism phenomenon discussed in Section
V.A. By contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
(7.89) and the FDA (8.08), an agency within HHS, were basically ranked the
same.
Consider, too, the stark differences in agencies dealing with labor and
employment: the NLRB (8.26) surprisingly ranked fourth overall, whereas
the EEOC (5.08) came in last place of twenty-eight agencies, and the Labor
Department (7.14) was nineteenth. In terms of overall agency-win rates in
the circuit courts, the NRLB prevailed 78.1% of the time, compared to
70.4% for the Labor Department and 42.9% for the EEOC. These circuitcourt findings differ substantially from findings on the Supreme Court
where, in one study, agency-win rates post-Chevron were virtually the same
243. This refusal to apply Chevron to FTC interpretations may be tied to a history of
antitrust exceptionalism. See, e.g., Gus Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 1191 (2014); Gus Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust, 76 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 209 (2014).
244. Note that we largely adopted the same coding methodology as Eskridge and Baer
with respect to the agency advancing the statutory interpretation. We coded for the most
specific agency on the Eskridge and Baer list. In other words, if the IRS was the agency that
promulgated the interpretation, we would code the interpretation as an IRS interpretation, as
opposed to a Treasury interpretation. The same is true, for instance, of the FDA versus HHS
and the Bureau of Prisons versus Justice Department. Conversely, because the various immigration agencies were reorganized when the Department of Homeland Security was created,
we decided to group all immigration decisions separately as “immigration agencies,” as opposed to DHS or Justice Department interpretations.
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for the EEOC (51.9%) and NLRB (52.4%) and somewhat better for the Labor Department (66.7%).245
Again, it is worth noting the wide range of circuit-court deference by
agency, which is similar to the range for subject matter. For instance, the
overall agency-win rate ranged from 100.0% for the ICC/STB to 45.5% for
the Energy Department and 42.9% for the EEOC. 246 The rate of circuit
courts applying Chevron ranged from 100.0% for FERC to 36.4% for the
FTC and 41.7% for HUD. Similarly, when circuit courts applied Chevron,
agency-win rates ranged from 100% for the ICC/STB and 93.3% for the
Treasury Department to 50.0% for the Energy Department. Like the disparities based on subject matter, these agency-by-agency differences complicate
the findings discussed in Part III regarding how Chevron matters in the circuit courts.
C.

Executive Versus Independent Agencies

One may also wonder how circuit courts treat executive and independent agencies differently. After all, the Chevron Court itself emphasized how
political accountability may be a justification for deferring to agency statutory interpretations.247 Figure 10 separates out the key findings as to executive and independent agencies.
Of the 1,558 interpretations in our dataset, 1,284 interpretations
(82.4%) were made by executive agencies, whereas the remaining 274 interpretations were made by independent agencies. 248 Perhaps surprisingly, the
245. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83
Fordham L. Rev. 497, 509 tbl.2 (2014). And the findings for the NLRB differ significantly
from Miles and Sunstein’s findings in the circuit courts concerning the NLRB’s win rate under
Chevron. They found that the agency prevailed 70.1% of the time, see Miles & Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 853, while we found that it prevailed significantly more—82.1% of the time.
246. By comparison, the 55 Skidmore-only cases arose from twenty different agencies,
with only three of those agencies having at least 5 cases. The agency-win rates for those agencies are: 57.1% for the Customs and Border Protection (7 cases); 55.6% for the Department of
Labor (18 cases); and 40% for the collective immigration agencies (EOIR, BIA, and DHS) (5
cases).
247. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices . . . .”).
248. Although there are various ways to categorize agencies as either executive agencies or
independent agencies, we relied on the Administrative Conference of the United States’
Sourcebook of the United States Executive Agencies and categorized agencies as independent if
they either have heads who can be removed only for cause or the agencies are otherwise usually categorized as independent regulatory commissions. See David E. Lewis & Jennifer L.
Selin, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 51 n.138, 52–53 tbl.4, 56 tbl.6 (2012). Accordingly, we categorized the following agencies
as independent: CFPB, CFTC, FCC, FDIC, FEC, FERC, Federal Marine Commission, Federal
Reserve, FLRA, FMSHRC, FTC, ICC/STB, ITC, MSPB, National Indian Gaming Commission,
National Mediation Board, NLRB, NTSB, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Post Office, Social
Security Administration, and SEC. We also categorized the two joint rulemakings between the
Federal Reserve and Treasury Department as independent.
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composite deference score for independent agencies (7.97) was higher than
for executive agencies (7.34). Indeed, independent agencies were more successful, to varying degrees, as to all three indicators of deference: the overall
agency-win rate (77.0% to 70.2%); the rate of circuit courts applying Chevron deference (82.5% to 73.2%); and the agency-win rate with Chevron deference (79.6% to 76.8%).
Figure 10. Win Rates for Executive Versus Independent Agencies
with and Without Chevron
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

7 7 .0 %
7 0 .2 %

8 2 .5 %
7 3 .2 %

7 6 .8 % 7 9 .6 %
6 4 .6 %
5 2 .0 %

O ve ra ll A g e n cy W in
R a te

C h e vro n A p p lie d

E xe cu tive A g e n cie s (n = 1 2 8 4 )

W in R a te W ith C h e vro n

W in R a te W ith o u t
C h e vro n

In d e p e n d e n t A g e n cie s (n = 2 7 4 )

Again, one should be cautious inferring causation here. Especially in
light of the nearly ten-percentage-point difference in Chevron deference being applied, one may be tempted to declare dead the political-accountability
theory for Chevron deference. Indeed, higher agency-win rates and significantly more Chevron applications are seemingly contrary to one scholar’s
view that independent agencies should receive less deference because they
lack the same political accountability as executive agencies.249 But there may
well be other explanations. Independent agencies may be more cautious in
seeking Chevron deference, and they may also be less aggressive in their interpretive efforts due to their independence from the President. The stark
difference in agency-win rates (64.6% for independent agencies to 52.0% for
executive agencies) when the circuit courts refused to apply the Chevron
framework may support the theory that independent agencies are less
aggressive.

249. See Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron
Deference, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 429 (2006).

58

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1

VI. Additional Findings: What Else Matters?
In this final Part, we consider some additional findings that are especially relevant to ascertain whether the circuit courts have internalized certain, often vague, nudges from the Supreme Court, especially when the
Court’s practice is to the contrary. We begin by looking at how the circuit
courts approach two sensitive subjects in Section IV.A, move in Section IV.B
to whether stable interpretations fare better than inconsistent ones (despite
similar doctrinal treatment), and conclude in Section IV.C by evaluating the
salience of certain traditional deference factors in the courts of appeals.
A. Sensitive Matters
As discussed in Section I.B.2, certain sensitive subjects—such as regulatory jurisdiction, state-law preemption, and significant political or economic
questions—have created wrinkles, at one time or another, in the Supreme
Court’s deference jurisprudence. Because the Court did not clearly identify
significant questions as relevant to all Chevron step-zero inquiries until
2015,250 very recently and well after our selected timeframe, we cannot say
what impact that decision has in the circuit courts. But our data can provide
insight as to regulatory jurisdiction and state-law preemption. Figure 11
compares the overall agency-win rate with the win rates for jurisdictional
and preemption interpretations (with the frequency of Chevron’s application
for each also depicted).
Figure 11. Comparison of Win Rates with and Without Chevron
Framework for Jurisdictional and Preemption Questions
100%
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80%
70%
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7 0 .5 %

8 3 .3 %
7 6 .0 %

5 3 .6 %
4 4 .4 %

T o ta l In te rp re ta tio n s (n = 1 5 5 8 )

W ith C h e vro n

Ju risd ictio n a l In te rp re ta tio n s
(n = 1 0 5 )
W ith o u t C h e vro n

P re e m p tio n In te rp re ta tio n s
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250. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). The Court had, however, strongly
suggested some form of this exception in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–68 (2006).
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The Court clarified in May 2013 in City of Arlington v. FCC that Chevron applied to regulatory-jurisdiction questions largely because of the difficulty of distinguishing run-of-the-mill interpretation questions from socalled jurisdictional ones.251 Before that ruling, however, Eskridge and Baer
had found that the Court applied Chevron to regulatory-jurisdiction questions only 34.4% of the time.252 The circuit courts, however, appeared to do
a better job of anticipating City of Arlington. Interpretations concerning regulatory jurisdiction made up 105 out of our 1,558 interpretations (6.7%).253
Of those 105, the circuit courts applied Chevron deference to 78 of them
(74.3%).254 Notably, this Chevron-application rate to regulatory-jurisdiction
interpretations (74.3%) was basically the same for all interpretations
(74.8%).
Although we did not directly code for major questions, we can get a
sense of how the courts responded to Oregon v. Gonzales’s exception that
declines to apply Chevron to changed agency positions as to major questions.255 To do so, we can parse the regulatory-jurisdiction interpretations
further by considering the frequency to which the circuit courts applied
Chevron to agency interpretations concerning their jurisdictional or regulatory authority that replaced a prior, inconsistent interpretation (what we
refer to as “evolving interpretations”). Of the 19 evolving interpretations
that concerned regulatory jurisdiction, the circuit courts applied the Chevron framework 17 times (89.4%). This application rate was significantly
higher than the average Chevron-application rates for all regulatory-jurisdiction interpretations (74.3%) and all interpretations, regardless of type, combined (74.8%). Despite these small numbers and the limited inferences that
we can draw from them, this finding suggests courts have not internalized
Gonzales’s step-zero exception.
Nevertheless, agency-win rates suggest that the circuit courts may be
slightly uncomfortable deferring to agencies on these seemingly more significant matters. Under any deference regime, agencies prevailed on regulatoryjurisdiction matters only 63.8% of the time (67 of 105 interpretations). That
win rate is somewhat lower than the overall agency-win rate of 71.4%. Similarly, despite receiving Chevron deference at basically the same rate as normal, agencies’ regulatory-jurisdiction interpretations prevailed 70.5% of the
time, a lower win rate than that of 77.4% for all Chevron applications. (That
251. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
252. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1131.
253. Like the Supreme Court, our impression, too, was that this variable was difficult to
code because of the difficulty in identifying which interpretations were “jurisdictional,” so we
erred on the side of being underinclusive.
254. Our coded decisions included only four decided after City of Arlington. Riffin v. Surface Transp. Bd., 733 F.3d 340 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 729
F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2013); Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2013); Helicopter Ass’n
Int’l v. FAA, 722 F.3d 430 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Only Dandino, which had a mixed question of
judicial and regulatory jurisdiction, did not apply Chevron. See Dandino, 729 F.3d at 920 n.1.
255. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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said, Chevron still mattered, as agencies prevailed on regulatory-interpretations 70.5% of time with Chevron, and only 44.4% of time without it.) In
the 17 of 19 instances when Chevron applied to an agency’s evolving regulatory-jurisdiction interpretation (similar to the Gonzales issue), the agencywin rate was 63.2% (12 wins). These slightly lower rates perhaps arise from
the general significance of agency decisions or aggressive agency interpretations to expand their dominion.
As for state-law preemption, the doctrinal and scholarly dispute concerning the suitability of Chevron deference to state-law preemption may not
be significantly meaningful to agencies. We uncovered only 25 interpretations concerning preemption in our dataset. Of those, the agency prevailed
80.0% of the time (20 of 25 cases). The agencies always prevailed when the
court applied no deference or did not indicate whether deference applied,
although there were only three of these decisions. The courts applied Chevron to 76.0% of the interpretations (19 of 25), and agencies prevailed 78.9%
of the time under Chevron, meaning that the Chevron-application and
agency-win rates were approximately the same as our database averages for
both variables in all interpretations (74.8% application rate and 77.4%
agency-win rate). This win rate under Chevron of 78.9% is near the agencywin rate for preemption questions when the circuit courts did not apply
Chevron (83.3%).
Despite the scholarly call for Skidmore deference to apply to state-law
preemption (from one of us and others)256 and the finding (from a study by
the other of us) that a majority of 128 agency rule drafters surveyed indicated that Congress does not delegate preemption matters to agencies,257 the
Skidmore-application rate is 12.0% (3 of 25), roughly the same rate for our
entire database (10.8%). Indeed, only one of those applications involved an
agency rulemaking, where Chevron would be more likely to apply under
Mead.258 Based on this small number of Skidmore decisions, the agency-win
rate is more than ten percentage points greater than the database average for
Skidmore (66.7% to 56.0%). The agency-win differential between Chevron
and Skidmore deference, therefore, decreases from more than twenty percentage points for all relevant interpretations in our database to about twelve
points for preemption-related interpretations. Again, however, we are dealing with small numbers.
Regulatory jurisdiction and state-law preemption together provide findings concerning two sensitive matters. These findings suggest that the circuit
256. See Barnett, supra note 76, at 22–51; Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption
Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 587 (2014) [hereinafter Barnett,
Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise]; Mendelson, supra note 92, at 742; Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 698 (2008); Catherine
M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
449, 491–98 (2008).
257. See Walker, supra note 94.
258. See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 127 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The agency prevailed
in this decision.
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courts have not internalized the Supreme Court’s often vague and conflicting signals over limiting Chevron’s application to certain matters because
they applied Chevron at higher rates to these matters than to all matters
combined. But the lower agency-win rates under Chevron for regulatory jurisdiction suggest that agencies may account for judicial unease as part of
their overall judicial review. All of this said, our findings do not allow us to
make any definite conclusions based on the nature of the Court’s unclear
directives, the relatively small number of decisions that arise in the circuit
courts on these matters, the limited questions that we coded, and the inherent limitations in our coding methodology that cannot account for ad hoc
concerns in the opinions or concerns that the courts did not express.
B. Interpretive Continuity
Interpretive continuity has a complex role in deference doctrines and
judicial interpretation generally.259 Interpretive continuity is relevant to
whether agencies receive Skidmore deference,260 but Chevron itself stated that
such continuity is not germane to Chevron deference.261 Nevertheless, both
before and after Chevron, the Court has identified its presence at times as a
factor to consider when reviewing an agency’s interpretation.262 Eskridge
and Baer found that, despite the Court’s tendency not to apply Chevron
where it would appear to apply,263 “the overwhelming majority of the cases
in which the Court invokes Chevron (70.6%) involve a long-standing or
fairly stable interpretation. Indeed[,] this category dwarfs applications of
Chevron where the agency interpretation is recent (27.1%) or evolving
(2.4%),”264 suggesting that the Court does not follow its own pronouncements as to Chevron’s applicability. Long-standing interpretations had an
overall success rate under any deference regime of 73.2%, while recent and
evolving interpretations had lower win rates of 66.9% and 60.5%, respectively, in the Supreme Court.265 We sought to determine how long-standing
and newer interpretations fared in the circuit courts.
259. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1823 (2015), for a thoughtful treatment of interpretive continuity in judicial
deference and interpretation.
260. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Merrill, supra note 10, at 977
(“[Chevron] appeared to downgrade the frequently cited factor stressing the importance of
agency views that were long-standing and consistent.”); Scalia, supra note 3, at 517 (“[Under
Chevron,] there is no longer any justification for giving ‘special’ deference to ‘longstanding and
consistent’ agency interpretations of law.”).
262. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (noting that interpretive duration,
among other things, influences deference); Merrill, supra note 10, at 972–73 (discussing deference before Chevron).
263. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1134–35.
264. Id. at 1133–34.
265. Based on these and other findings, Eskridge and Baer determined that the Court’s
favorable treatment of long-standing interpretations “stands the Chevron Revolution on its
head.” Id. at 1150.
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Based on information that we could glean from the opinion itself, we
coded the duration of interpretations as long-standing, evolving (meaning
that one interpretation replaced a prior one), recent (meaning that a new
interpretation did not replace a prior one), and unclear. Our coding was
similar to Eskridge and Baer’s, except that we added an “unclear” category.
We coded interpretations where the court made some reference to the stability or date of the agency interpretation, while we coded those for which we
could not discern the longevity from the decision as “unclear.” We had a
fairly even sample of interpretations of long-standing, recent, and unclear
vintage. Approximately one-third of our interpretations were long-standing
(34.5%), one-third were of unknown duration (35.0%), and one-third were
either recent or evolving (30.5%).
Our data indicate that long-standing interpretations prevailed more frequently than other interpretations. Of all long-standing interpretations regardless of deference regime, agencies prevailed 82.3% of the time—far
ahead of ones that were evolving (59.8%), recent (65.9%), or of unknown
duration (67.8%). As compared to Eskridge and Baer’s findings, the longstanding interpretations fared even better in the circuit courts (about nine
percentage points better), while the recent and evolving interpretations fared
about the same (both only one percentage point worse).266 That said, if we
combine all interpretations under any deference regime for long-standing
interpretations and those whose duration is unclear (1,086 interpretations),
as it appears that Eskridge and Baer did, the agency-win rate (813 wins out
of 1,084 interpretations) falls to 75.0%, almost the same as theirs for longstanding interpretations. Figure 12 summarizes these comparisons, with the
unknown category in our study broken out separately.
Figure 12. Agency-Win Rates Based on Continuity of
Agency Statutory Interpretation
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266. See supra notes 263–265 and accompanying text.
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When it came to applying the Chevron framework, however, circuit
courts were not more likely to apply Chevron to long-standing interpretations than other interpretations. Courts applied Chevron to 76.2% of longstanding interpretations (410 out of 538) and roughly the same frequency to
recent interpretations (76.1%, or 194 of 255 interpretations). The surprise
came with evolving interpretations. Circuit courts applied Chevron even
more frequently to them (86.3%, or 189 of 219 interpretations). When the
interpretation was unclear, courts applied Chevron 68.3% of the time (373 of
546 interpretations). When we parsed the data further to see whether courts
applied Chevron at different rates for long-standing versus new or evolving
interpretations that were presumptively Chevron-eligible (meaning those
from formal rulemaking or adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking), the disparity disappeared. Circuit courts applied the Chevron framework to 88.1% of long-standing formal interpretations and 87.7% of
evolving or recent formal interpretations (92.0% and 83.3%, respectively).267
Once Chevron applied, long-standing agency interpretations triumphed
again, especially over evolving ones. Long-standing interpretations prevailed
87.6% of the time. Interpretations of recent or unclear vintage were affirmed
at lower rates of 74.7% and 73.5%, respectively. Evolving interpretations, the
interpretations most likely to have Chevron apply, had the lowest agency-win
rate of 65.6%.268 Despite having the lowest agency-win rate under Chevron,
this win rate for evolving interpretations was actually its highest by a significant margin under any of the deference regimes. Evolving interpretations
have the lowest win rate under every deference regime except de novo review, often by wide margins. For instance, they had a 0.0% win rate in the
three instances when the courts identified no deference regime, in comparison to a win rate of 72.7% for long-standing interpretations. Likewise, evolving agency interpretations prevailed only 30.8% of the time under de novo
review (13 instances), with only recent interpretations doing more poorly
with a win rate of 16.7% (24 instances). Under Skidmore, evolving interpretations prevailed only 21.4% of the time (14 instances), while recent ones
267. Long-standing informal interpretations received the Chevron framework only 32.5%
of the time, while evolving or recent informal interpretations received the Chevron framework
more often—both at 59.0%.
268. Because of differences in coding, it is difficult to compare our data with Kerr’s. He
compared consistent and inconsistent interpretations by scanning opinions to see if the courts
mentioned “changes in the agency’s interpretation over time” or not. If they didn’t, he assumed consistency. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 24. We distinguished evolving interpretations
from all others based on a similar methodology, except that we marked those with no indication of an interpretation’s duration as unclear. If we combine our unclear, recent, and longstanding interpretations that were subject to the Chevron framework (all of which would appear “consistent” under Kerr’s methodology), agencies prevailed 79.6% of the time (in 778 of
977 interpretations), a slightly higher rate than the 74% win rate that Kerr found. See id. at 32
chart 1. For inconsistent (or evolving) interpretations, his agency-win rate (68%), id., is
slightly higher than ours (65.6%). Ultimately, our differential between the win rates of consistent and inconsistent interpretations (fourteen percentage points) is quite larger than his (six
percentage points).
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prevailed 46.2% of the time (26 instances) and long-standing ones 67.6% of
the time (71 instances). The findings are fully presented in Figure 13.
Based on our coding, we can further mine the data on recent and evolving interpretations. When courts reviewed evolving or recent interpretations
under Chevron, certain of those interpretations did significantly better than
others. Of the 383 recent or evolving interpretations to which courts applied
Chevron, they arose in response to new or amended statutes (98), agencies
facing new issues (95 interpretations), changed facts or judicial decisions
(91), the agency’s practical experience (67), new presidential administrations
(8), reevaluated litigating positions (3), or in response to a judicial decision
(1)—with the remainder for unclear reasons (20). Agency interpretations in
the four largest categories all prevailed under Chevron at relatively consistent
and high rates: from a high of 73.1% and 72.5% for practical experience and
changed circumstances, respectively, to 70.4% and 69.5% for new statutory
provisions and new issues, respectively. A sharp drop occurred when the
reasons weren’t clear (60.0%, based on 20 interpretations) or the changed
interpretation came from a new administration (50.0%, based on 8
interpretations).
Figure 13. Agency-Win Rates Based on Continuity of Agency
Statutory Interpretation, by Deference Doctrine (n=1558)
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What to make of this continuity data?
First, the findings suggest that the circuit courts have followed Chevron’s
command that Chevron applies with equal force to all agency positions,
whether they are changed, new, or long-standing. The circuit courts’ Chevron-application rate was similar for recent and long-standing interpretations, and the rate even increased for evolving interpretations, perhaps
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because the government went out of its way to point out Chevron’s command on the duration issue. 269 Moreover, when we filtered the data further
to compare long-standing with new or evolving interpretations that were
presumptively Chevron-eligible, the courts applied Chevron at almost the
same rate (88.1% and 87.7%, respectively).
Second, once Chevron applied, interpretive duration seems to matter,
although the nature of that relationship is unclear. Long-standing interpretations prevailed 87.6% of the time, approximately thirteen and fourteen
percentage points more often than new interpretations and those of unclear
duration, respectively, and twenty-two percentage points more often than
evolving interpretations. Accounting for an interpretation’s longevity in the
deference process, despite seeming contrary to Chevron itself, would be consistent with courts thinking of deference on a sliding scale, as Justice Breyer
has long advocated, perhaps most successfully in Barnhart. And it would be
consistent with the Court’s recent invocation of interpretive duration when
it blessed a Patent and Trademark Office rule under Chevron step two.270 But
it may also be that long-standing interpretations are more likely to be better
thought-out and less aggressive than more recent, especially changed, ones.
The noticeable lack of agency success when a new administration simply
changes the interpretation might suggest that circuit courts have not fully
embraced the political-accountability theory that undergirds Chevron. Chevron recognized that the political branches had more accountability than
unelected judges and were in a better position to make policy choices inherent in interpretive issues.271 Indeed, the Chevron Court deferred to the Reagan Administration’s interpretation, despite the fact that the Carter
Administration had interpreted the term at issue differently.272 Or it could
show judicial discomfort with APA arbitrary-and-capricious review, which
some decisions have folded into Chevron step two (as opposed to treating it
as a distinct step).273 In Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent, joined
by three other justices, blessed an agency’s reasonable reappraisal of costs
and benefits in light of a new administration,274 but the majority’s silence on
this point and preference for technocratic analysis has been understood to
mean that changes based on political forces are improper.275 Ultimately,
269. This strategy is consistent with the “playbook” that federal government litigators use
to defend agency statutory interpretations, which “tends to be based on general principles of
administrative law.” Walker, supra note 107, at 154; see also Walker, supra note 156, at 77–87
(exploring in greater detail this playbook, which is based in part on experiences working on
the Justice Department’s Civil Appellate Staff).
270. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2016).
271. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
272. See id. at 857–58, 866.
273. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 8 n.15 (2009) (discussing courts that combine step two and arbitraryand-capricious review and scholars who support them).
274. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275. Watts, supra note 273, at 5.
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however, the small number of interpretations limits the inferences that one
can draw from them. Indeed, that only 9 of the 474 total recent or evolving
interpretations expressly implicated change in administration may reflect
agencies’ strategic decisionmaking to avoid justifying a new or different interpretation on political grounds. And, notably, these data do not tell us
when courts are expressly referring to an interpretation’s duration as part of
their analysis. We discuss the invocation of factors, including duration, in
Section VI.C.
Third, Skidmore seems to be working much as expected. Interpretive
consistency is a germane factor under the doctrine that favors an agency’s
position. Long-standing interpretations prevailed more frequently (67.6%)
than others, indeed at a rate above the average rate for all Skidmore decisions
(56.0%). The other interpretations’ agency-win rates were below the average,
as one would expect: 21.4% for evolving ones, 46.2% for new ones, and
54.4% for ones of unclear duration. It makes sense that if consistency were
the concern, new decisions would not evidence inconsistency (because there
is no prior interpretation with which to be inconsistent) and thus should
prevail more frequently than evolving ones that do, even if at a lesser rate
than long-standing, consistent ones.
Finally, agencies seeking to issue evolving interpretations should be
mindful of how they do so. Although agency-win rates were at their nadir
for those interpretations under nearly every deference regime, agencies seem
to be able to significantly improve their win rates by providing the interpretations with the force of law to render it more likely that they obtain Chevron deference, under which evolving interpretations prevailed 65.6% of the
time. When agencies use less-formal means, courts are much less likely to
apply the Chevron framework—only 59.0% for informal evolving interpretations but 92.0% for formal ones. With Chevron, the agency-win rate was
65.6%, but it plummeted to 30.8% with de novo review. And they plummeted forty-four percentage points from the 65.6% win rate under Chevron
to the 21.4% win rate under Skidmore. Moreover, even with Chevron deference, agencies should carefully consider the reasons for the change. Changes
based on differing political administrations or unclear changes suffered significantly lower win rates. When changing interpretations, agencies will
likely place themselves on better footing by clearly pointing to changed facts
and their experience to support the change.
C.

Traditional Deference Factors or Theoretical Grounds

Before Chevron, the courts evaluated various factors in an ad hoc manner to determine whether to defer to agency interpretations. These factors
included whether the matter fell within the agency’s expertise, its careful
consideration over a long period of time, congressional delegation, its contemporaneity with the statute’s enactment, or vague notions of congressional ratification. 276 Although Chevron and Mead had suggested that some
276. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 973–74.
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of these factors were more important than others (delegation) or no longer
relevant (consistency) when deciding whether Chevron applied, the Court’s
dicta in Barnhart referred to more than delegation and force-of-law authority. It invoked some of these traditional factors—agency expertise, congressional acquiescence, and the agency’s careful consideration over a long
period of time—and some additional ones concerning the nature of the legal question and the complexity of the statute.277
To get a sense of these factors’ relevance in the circuit courts, we followed Eskridge and Baer’s coding, where they added three theoretical factors
and combined some of the contextual factors: agency expertise, accountability, national standard, long-standing interpretation, contemporaneity, public
reliance, rulemaking authority, agency procedures, and congressional acquiescence.278 Like Eskridge and Baer, we coded each variable if the circuit court
expressly referred to one of them in its opinion, whether specifically in the
step-zero context or as part of its analysis of the interpretation itself. Similarly, we coded these factors whether courts noted their presence or absence;
the findings reported in this Section do not disaggregate them. We found
that only four of these factors had even an arguably regular place in circuit
courts’ deference discourse under any regime. Figure 14 depicts these
findings.
Figure 14. Frequency of Reference to Theoretical and Contextual
Factors for Judicial Deference to Agency Statutory
Interpretations (n=1558)
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277. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
278. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 10, at 1216. Eskridge and Baer did not discuss their
findings on these factors. Although it appears that Merrill’s identified factors largely overlap
with Eskridge and Baer’s, we were less certain exactly which factors he considered in his coding. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 981. Similarly, Kerr coded two of these variables and an
additional one: contemporaneity, longstandingness, and consistency. See Kerr, supra note 17,
at 22–24. But he did not code for judicial invocation of them. See id.
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The most-invoked factors were not surprising: agency procedures utilized (25.7% of the time), rulemaking authority (18.3%), agency expertise
(18.4%), and interpretive stability (10.7%). One would have expected, if anything, the first two to figure more prominently because they are the two
factors that relate most closely to Mead’s delegation inquiry and concern for
formality.
Expertise’s limited prominence in the dataset was also contrary to expectations. It is one of the relevant factors for Skidmore deference, and it is
likely to come up as part of an inquiry into whether Congress intended to
delegate certain issues. But once again, if there is any surprise here, it is that
expertise played such a small role in our Skidmore interpretations. Courts
referred to expertise in 42.9% of the 168 Skidmore decisions, 15.3% of the
1,166 Chevron decisions, and 24.8% of the 117 de novo decisions. Despite its
serving as the theoretical basis for the Skidmore doctrine and its relevance to
the agency’s reasoning and consideration,279 it was invoked less than half the
time for interpretations to which the Skidmore framework applied.
And so the story goes for interpretive stability. The courts referred to
the duration of an interpretation in only 10.7% of all their discussions and
only 8.9% of interpretations where Chevron applied. These numbers are
smaller than expected, considering that courts agreed with long-standing
agency interpretations at higher rates regardless of deference regime as well
as under Chevron. Courts were, as with agency expertise, more likely to refer
to this factor when they applied Skidmore, the regime under which consistency is a factor. They referred to it in 23.8% of all 168 Skidmore decisions.
But because it is a Skidmore factor, one would have expected it, as well, to be
referred to more frequently than only about a quarter of the time. The circuit courts’ ambivalence in expressing its thoughts on the long-standing nature of the agency statutory interpretation—no matter its actual impact on
decisionmaking—ultimately confirms one leading scholar’s view that the
federal courts have not thought out interpretive durability’s place in judicial
review.280
The five remaining factors were obscure in circuit-court decisions.
Courts invoked political accountability in 0.5% of all interpretations, public
reliance in 0.7%, contemporaneity in 1.9%, national standards in 2.2%, and
congressional acquiescence in 3.1%.
These results provide some (albeit limited) insights on the place of
Mead, Barnhart, and the remaining contextual factors. Mead’s focus on delegation and formality, unsurprisingly, has a firm grasp on the circuit courts.
Two of the most significant factors that courts invoked were agency procedures and rulemaking authority, both of which focus on the ability of the
agencies to speak with the force of law and use of that authority. Relatedly,
given the high rates at which formalized agency interpretations received
Chevron deference,281 it appears that courts and parties considered formality
279. Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise, supra note 256, at 589.
280. See Krishnakumar, supra note 259, at 1830–43.
281. See supra Figure 5.
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even if they did not usually mention it. Given Mead’s relatively straightforward view as to formal interpretations, these factors’ prominence is not
surprising.
The salience of Barnhart’s dicta, in contrast, is less certain. Of the three
Barnhart factors that we coded (expertise, longevity, and congressional acquiescence), courts invoked the first two more frequently than other contextual factors, but still at relatively low rates of 18.4% and 10.7% and more
frequently in the context of Skidmore review in which they are doctrinal
factors. But similar to our inferences from our data on Chevron applications
to formal interpretations above, our data on interpretations’ duration—
where consistent agency interpretations prevailed at higher rates under all
deference regimes combined, despite not receiving Chevron deference at increased levels282—suggest that the factor may be doing silent work in the
circuit courts’ decisionmaking after a step-zero inquiry. Unlike with longstanding interpretations, we do not have another variable that might illuminate whether agency expertise informs circuit-court decisionmaking even
when the courts do not refer to it. As to the third factor, circuit courts
referred to congressional acquiescence only 3.1% of the time, significantly
less than the other two factors, suggesting perhaps that it has little salience in
judicial decisionmaking. Yet, as with the other variables, we cannot rule out
the chance that courts consider congressional acquiescence without mentioning it.
The remaining ad hoc contextual factors or theoretical concerns appear
to have little purchase on the circuit courts, which referred to any one of
them only, at most, approximately 2% of the time. Their low salience suggests that certain traditional factors have faded from judicial memory. Most
prominently, contemporaneity (along with long-standing consistency), a
traditional factor of long provenance, has essentially lost its hold on circuit
courts.283 This finding was not surprising given the Supreme Court’s consistent view that “neither antiquity nor contemporaneity with [a] statute is a
condition of [a regulation’s] validity.” 284 Perhaps, though, like other factors,
courts accept contemporaneous interpretations more frequently and thus
the factor is doing more work behind the scenes than expressed invocations
suggest. 285
Although we coded for courts’ express references to contemporaneity,
we did not code specifically for contemporaneous interpretations by themselves. But if we use our variable of recent interpretations arising from a new
or amended statute as contemporaneous (117 interpretations), contemporaneous interpretations prevailed under any deference regime 63.2% of the
282. See supra Section VI.B.
283. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
284. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996)).
285. Indeed, Kerr found that agency interpretations promulgated within four years of a
statute’s enactment were 12% more likely to prevail. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 33–34, 33
chart 3.
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time and under Chevron 69.5% of the time. Notably, both of these numbers
were lower than the overall agency-win rate under any regime (71.4%) and
the average Chevron agency-win rate (77.4%), suggesting that contemporaneity does not have the same pull on courts as the win rates suggest that
stability and formality do. That said, our variable for recent interpretations
arising from a new or amended statute wouldn’t include all contemporaneous interpretations, such as those that are long-standing (and thus not new)
but issued contemporaneously with a statute’s enactment or amendment.
And it may include interpretations that, while new, did not occur until many
years after a statute’s enactment or amendment because, after all, rulemaking or adjudication takes time. Because our variable doesn’t track contemporaneity perfectly, our conclusions are necessarily limited.
Whatever the normative value of the Barnhart and other contextual factors in judicial deference, their largescale absence from deference discussions
in the circuit courts suggests that courts prefer the relatively more rule-like
certainty of Mead than the ad hoc approaches before Chevron or offered by
Barnhart. This is so despite the fact that the ad hoc approaches would provide circuit courts more discretion and allow them to better hide strategic
decisionmaking to allow courts to align policy preferences with their interpretations. Like Odysseus tied to the mast, circuit courts seem to have found
some benefits in having others limit their agency.
Conclusion
Let us briefly return to where we began with our findings in Part III—
the big picture. We have discussed particular findings and their implications
in each Part. But what broader insights about Chevron Regular and Chevron
Supreme can we glean from stepping back and considering our findings as a
whole?
We have demonstrated empirically that, contrary to how they fare in the
Supreme Court,286 agencies usually prevail more under Chevron than other
standards of review in the circuit courts (at least when those courts refer to
Chevron).287 This finding is meaningful for agencies and litigating parties
because circuit courts review far more agency statutory interpretations than
the Supreme Court. Although we cannot say in our discussion here how the
deference standards affect judicial decisionmaking, we can say outcomes do
vary. Because they do, one leading scholar’s call, based on findings from past
empirical studies, for practitioners, teachers, courts, and scholars to deemphasize review standards appears premature.288 They seem to matter, even if
286. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Section III.A.
288. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 93–98; cf. Richard Pierce, Circuit Courts Do Strange Things
with Chevron, Jotwell (Sept. 6, 2016), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/circuit-courts-do-strangethings-with-chevron/ [https://perma.cc/AH4B-XFMN] (reviewing an earlier draft of this Article and noting, inter alia, that “whatever Chevron means in circuit courts, the circuit court
version differs from the Supreme Court version in many ways”).
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no one, including us (based on methodological limitations), can yet say exactly how.
If Chevron matters, we should consider whether it is functioning properly. The Supreme Court indicated that Chevron exists to provide agencies a
congressionally delegated space to regulate, where courts keep agencies in
their space without imposing their own policy judgments.289 The doctrine
largely appears to fail at achieving these aims in the Supreme Court based on
its rare invocation290 and failure to constrict the justices’ perceived preferences.291 Prior studies of the circuit courts have also found that Chevron does
not appear to meaningfully constrict judges from deciding in accord with
their perceived political preferences292—at least when a judge on a panel
with different political preferences isn’t on the panel.293 Although we leave
our ideology data and more sophisticated statistical modeling for future
work, our initial, descriptive findings suggest, based on a larger dataset than
in prior studies, that Chevron has some kind of disciplining effect in the
aggregate on circuit courts because agency-win rates are so disparate between when Chevron applies and when it does not, even when the agency
statutory interpretations use the same formal interpretive methods.294
More specifically, our thirty-nine-percentage-point difference between
agency-win rates under Chevron and de novo review suggests that courts
distinguish looking for the best answer from permitting a reasonable one.295
If they are able and willing to do so, then the Supreme Court’s recently
invoked “stabilizing purpose”—to render outcomes from thirteen circuit
courts more predictable296 and thereby further the uniformity goals that Peter Strauss highlighted decades ago297—becomes more compelling, regardless of the delegation theory’s normative force.298 Indeed, as federal dockets
have swelled, Chevron may be one more device that federal courts have used
to avoid what they perceive as low-value or low-interest cases.299
But, at the same time, our data indicate that the Supreme Court needs
to provide better guidance to lower courts if it seeks to create a stabilizing
doctrine. The circuit-by-circuit disparity in the circuit courts’ invocation of
289. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
291. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 11, at 825–26.
292. See id. at 826–27 (considering NLRB and EPA).
293. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 14, at 2175–76.
294. See supra Figure 6.
295. See supra Figure 3.
296. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
297. See Strauss, supra note 102, at 1117.
298. See Barnett, supra note 76, at 14–22 (discussing views on Chevron’s delegation
theory).
299. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies,
65 Duke L.J. 1, 68 (2015) (noting that an appellate review model over agency action is an
example of federal courts seeking to “mitigate[ ] [the] caseload demands created by the new
federal regulatory state” and to remove “ ‘[p]etty’ cases” from their docket).
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Chevron and agency-win rates reveals that Chevron may not be operating
uniformly among the circuits.300 To ameliorate uniformity, the Court should
provide clearer guidance to numerous issues, which other scholars have
noted: What are the “traditional tools of statutory construction”301 to which
Chevron referred for step one that courts should use?302 Should the longstanding nature of agency interpretations matter?303 What role exactly
should legislative history or a purposivist inquiry have?304 Is there an “order
of battle” in which the circuit courts proceed through certain steps or interpretive canons to interpret statutes?305 Is step two different from arbitraryand-capricious review and, if so, how?306 And perhaps more prominently,
what role do agency expertise, formality, and the significance of the question
have when determining when Congress has delegated authority to agencies?307 If Chevron is a means of controlling the lower courts, the case for
providing more guidance becomes urgent.
And our findings, albeit to a limited degree, suggest that lower courts
will view more rule-based guidance as a comforting swaddling blanket
rather than handcuffs. Circuit courts rarely invoked various values—including those mentioned in Barnhart—that they could have used to gain additional discretion in deciding whether to invoke Chevron or ultimately side
with the agency.308 And they appeared to largely ignore troubling step-zero
questions concerning sensitive matters, perhaps having difficulty discerning
the Supreme Court’s vague or inconsistent signals as to these matters.309 If
300. See supra Figures 9 & 10, Table 1.
301. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
302. See Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev.
329, 347 (2007) (discussing the Court’s failure to define the “traditional tools”).
303. See generally Krishnakumar, supra note 259.
304. See generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: a Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 725 (2007), for a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s
unclear and conflicting treatment of how to discern congressional intent under Chevron step
one, whether with all or only some of the following: text, legislative history, or purpose. See
generally Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation,
2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 89, 119, for an argument that only agency interpretations that further
a statutory scheme’s purpose can be reasonable. Very recently, the Court suggested that text,
purpose, and history all inform Chevron’s step-one inquiry. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“Finally, neither the statutory language, its purpose, or its history suggest that Congress considered what standard the agency should apply . . . .”).
305. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 184, at 608.
306. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. The Court may have provided some guidance on this point when it refused to defer to an agency rule under Chevron when the
agency’s failure to sufficiently explain why it replaced a prior statutory interpretation with a
new one was arbitrary and capricious. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,
2126 (2016). Because the Court did not engage in a two-step inquiry, it appears that arbitraryand-capricious review is its own inquiry, unrelated to Chevron’s step-two reasonableness
inquiry.
307. See supra Section I.B.1.
308. See supra Section VI.C.
309. See supra Section VI.A.
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Chevron can function as a welcomed supervisory doctrine, the differences
between Chevron Supreme—functioning as a malleable, discretionary canon
of construction310—and Chevron Regular—functioning as precedent—become less troubling.
Exceptional questions, rare theoretical grounds, and Chevron’s inconsistent use can permit the Supreme Court to keep the delegation theory in
check at the margins without, as our data suggest, creating confusion and, as
we plan to consider in future work, promoting ideological decisionmaking
in the circuit courts. Indeed, two scholars have recently argued that distinctions between Chevron Supreme and Chevron Regular, at least as to major
questions, are normatively justified.311 Their argument follows another
scholar’s call for the degree of deference to agency interpretations to vary
based on the deciding court’s place in the federal judicial hierarchy, with
more deference in lower courts and less deference in superior courts.312 But
even if differences in deference among courts defy normative justification as
to all interpretive matters or exceptional questions, our data suggest that any
problematic characteristics of Chevron Supreme do not necessarily trickle
down to the lower courts. Ultimately, Chevron Supreme, with its comparatively broader discretion, will shift power from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court and agencies but leave Chevron Regular in place to create more
certainty in the lower courts and, thus, greater national uniformity in federal
administrative law.313
This is not our last word on what our data say about Chevron, and we
hope that it furthers numerous other conversations concerning deference to
agency statutory interpretations—whether about its normative place, its operation, or its meaningfulness.

310. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 1727, 1734–35 (2010) (arguing that based on Supreme Court practice, Chevron is a canon of construction, not a precedent).
311. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 Vand. L. Rev.
777, 781–82 (2017). But see Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Response, Short-Circuiting
the New Major Questions Doctrine, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 147, 155 (2017), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/vu-wp0/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/04/25135222/Short-Circuitingthe-New-Major-Questions-Doctrine.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FWX-SEFG] (arguing that lower
courts should apply the new major questions doctrine because the doctrine directly implicates
congressional delegation and because they can provide useful “percolation” benefits for the
Supreme Court).
312. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727 (2013).
313. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 107, at 156–58 (arguing that Supreme Court’s application of Chevron to substantive patent law could be “a means of weakening the Federal
Circuit”).

